Incentives and public inputs Export

@article{citeulike:4260533, abstract = {Considered in this paper is a mechanism to coordinate the decision to provide a public input to a group of firms designed to overcome the 'free rider' problem. The coordinating agent relies on information communicated by the firms and it is shown that the mechanism provides an incentive for each firm to send truthful information so that an optimal quantity of the public input will be provided.}, author = {Groves, T.}, citeulike-article-id = {4260533}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(75)90001-8}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0047-2727(75)90001-8}, doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(75)90001-8}, issn = {00472727}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, keywords = {annotation, games, good, p2p, public}, month = {August}, number = {3}, pages = {211--226}, posted-at = {2009-04-02 20:24:10}, priority = {2}, title = {Incentives and public inputs}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(75)90001-8}, volume = {4}, year = {1975} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:4260533 L3 - citeulike-article-id:4260533 N2 - Considered in this paper is a mechanism to coordinate the decision to provide a public input to a group of firms designed to overcome the ‘free rider’ problem. The coordinating agent relies on information communicated by the firms and it is shown that the mechanism provides an incentive for each firm to send truthful information so that an optimal quantity of the public input will be provided. IS - 3 JF - Journal of Public Economics SN - 00472727 EP - 226 TI - Incentives and public inputs VL - 4 SP - 211 KW - annotation KW - games KW - good KW - p2p KW - public AU - Groves, T PY - 1975/08// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(75)90001-8 ER -