Un-making artificial moral agents Export

@article{citeulike:3481141, abstract = {Abstract\ \ Floridi and Sanders, seminal work, ” On the morality of artificial agents” has catalyzed attention around the moral status of computer systems that perform tasks for humans, effectively acting as ” artificial agents.” Floridi and Sanders argue that the class of entities considered moral agents can be expanded to include computers if we adopt the appropriate level of abstraction. In this paper we argue that the move to distinguish levels of abstraction is far from decisive on this issue. We also argue that adopting certain levels of abstraction out of context can be dangerous when the level of abstraction obscures the humans who constitute computer systems. We arrive at this critique of Floridi and Sanders by examining the debate over the moral status of computer systems using the notion of interpretive flexibility. We frame the debate as a struggle over the meaning and significance of computer systems that behave independently, and not as a debate about the 'true' status of autonomous systems. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that while levels of abstraction are useful for particular purposes, when it comes to agency and responsibility, computer systems should be conceptualized and identified in ways that keep them tethered to the humans who create and deploy them.}, author = {Johnson, Deborah and Miller, Keith}, citeulike-article-id = {3481141}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9174-6}, doi = {10.1007/s10676-008-9174-6}, journal = {Ethics and Information Technology}, keywords = {delft, morality, multiagent, repsonsibility}, posted-at = {2009-10-13 14:57:37}, priority = {2}, title = {Un-making artificial moral agents}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9174-6} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3481141 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3481141 N2 - Abstract  Floridi and Sanders, seminal work, “On the morality of artificial agents” has catalyzed attention around the moral status of computer systems that perform tasks for humans, effectively acting as “artificial agents.” Floridi and Sanders argue that the class of entities considered moral agents can be expanded to include computers if we adopt the appropriate level of abstraction. In this paper we argue that the move to distinguish levels of abstraction is far from decisive on this issue. We also argue that adopting certain levels of abstraction out of context can be dangerous when the level of abstraction obscures the humans who constitute computer systems. We arrive at this critique of Floridi and Sanders by examining the debate over the moral status of computer systems using the notion of interpretive flexibility. We frame the debate as a struggle over the meaning and significance of computer systems that behave independently, and not as a debate about the ‘true’ status of autonomous systems. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that while levels of abstraction are useful for particular purposes, when it comes to agency and responsibility, computer systems should be conceptualized and identified in ways that keep them tethered to the humans who create and deploy them. JF - Ethics and Information Technology TI - Un-making artificial moral agents KW - delft KW - morality KW - multiagent KW - repsonsibility AU - Johnson, Deborah AU - Miller, Keith UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9174-6 ER -