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posted to free-choice
by fintelkai
on 2012-11-06 11:44:44
Abstract
This study argues that free choice items (FCIs) form a distinct class of lexical items. Just like other lexical items, they are associated with alternatives. Their core semantic property is that they have descriptive contents that bring information on these alternatives. In doing so, they form three interpretational categories: (1) full set FCIs, or else FCIs that express widening, require that all alternatives of the relevant type, without exception, are considered, (2) subset FCIs that express ignorance require that unknown alternatives ...
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posted to conjunction coordination
by fintelkai
on 2012-11-06 11:42:40
Abstract
Pragmatic accounts for and conjunctions offer a unified analysis for all conjunctions ( [0070], [0120] and [0230]). I propose two distinct interpretative strategies instead. On the relational strategy, the inferred relation between the conjuncts is computed first, and only then is relevance to the discourse sought for the two conjuncts taken as a single processing unit. On the independent strategy, each conjunct by itself makes a separate, but parallel contribution to the same discourse point. Different formal indicators cue addressees as to which ...
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posted to conditionals counterfactuals
by fintelkai
on 2012-10-14 04:15:55
Abstract
In this paper I present some difficulties for Lewis’s and similar theories of counterfactuals, and suggest that the problem lies in the notion of absolute similarity. In order to explain the problem, I discuss the relation between Lewis’s and Goodman’s theory, and show that the two theories are not related in the way Lewis thought they were. ...
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posted to evidentials implicature
by fintelkai
on 2012-10-04 14:47:54
Abstract
This paper develops an analysis of a scalar implicature that is induced by the use of reportative evidentials such as the Cuzco Quechua enclitic = si and the German modal sollen . Reportatives, in addition to specifying the speaker’s source of information for a statement as a report by someone else, also usually convey that the speaker does not have direct evidence for the proposition expressed. While this type of implicature can be calculated using the same kind of Gricean reasoning ...
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Abstract
Kaplanian, two-dimensional theories secure rigidity for indexicals by positing special contexts and semantic mechanisms reserved only for indexicals. The result is a deep and unexplained chasm between expressions that depend on the extra-linguistic context and expressions that depend on the discourse context. Theories that treat indexicals as anaphoric, presuppositional expressions (e.g., Zeevat 1999; Roberts 2002; Hunter & Asher 2005; Maier 2006, 2009) have the potential to be more minimal and general than Kaplanian, two-dimensional theories—the mechanism of presupposition, unlike that of ...
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posted to focus pronouns
by fintelkai
on 2012-08-07 12:41:03
Abstract
The presence of contrastive focus on pronouns interpreted as bound variables is puzzling. Bound variables do not refer, and it is therefore unclear how two of them can be made to contrast with each other. It is argued that this is a problem for both alternative-based accounts such as Rooth’s (Nat Lang Semantics 1:75–116, 1992 ) and givenness-based ones such as Schwarzschild’s (Nat Lang Semantics 7:141–177, 1999 ). The present paper shows that previous approaches to this puzzle face an empirical ...
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Abstract
“Counterfactual” readings of might/could have were previously analyzed using metaphysical modal bases. This paper presents examples and scenarios where the assumptions of such a branching-time semantics are not met, because there are facts at the base world that preclude the complement of the modal becoming true. Additional arguments show that counterfactual readings are context dependent. These data motivate a semantics using a circumstantial (or factual) modal base, which refers to context-dependent facts about a world and time. The analysis is formulated ...
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posted to implicature scalar
by fintelkai
on 2012-07-21 19:30:05
Abstract
It has been generally assumed that certain categories of numerical expressions, such as ‘more than n ’, ‘at least n ’, and ‘fewer than n ’, systematically fail to give rise to scalar implicatures in unembedded declarative contexts. Various proposals have been developed to explain this perceived absence. In this paper, we consider the relevance of scale granularity to scalar implicature, and make two novel predictions: first, that scalar implicatures are in fact available from these numerical expressions at the appropriate ...
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Abstract
I argue that compositionality (in the sense of homomorphic interpretation) is compatible with radical and pervasive contextual effects on interpretation. Apparent problems with this claim lose their force if we are careful in distinguishing the question of how a grammar assigns interpretations from the question of how people figure out which interpretations the grammar assigns. I demonstrate, using a simple example, that this latter task must sometimes be done not by computing a derivation defined directly by the grammar, but through ...
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posted to conditionals material
by fintelkai
on 2012-06-26 16:38:43
Abstract
A number of papers have argued in favour of the material account of indicative conditionals, but typically they either concentrate on defending the account from the charge that it has counterintuitive consequences, or else focus on some particular positive argument in favour of the theory. In this paper, I survey the various positive arguments that can be given, presenting simple versions where possible and showing the connections between them. I conclude with some methodological considerations. ...
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posted to conditionals reasoning
by fintelkai
on 2012-06-05 21:31:49
Abstract
Some of the information we receive comes to us in an explicitly conditional form. It is an open question how to model the accommodation of such information in a Bayesian framework. This paper presents data suggesting that there may be no strictly Bayesian account of updating on conditionals. Specifically, the data seem to indicate that such updating at least sometimes proceeds on the basis of explanatory considerations, which famously have no home in standard Bayesian epistemology. The paper also proposes a ...
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Abstract
While there is now considerable experimental evidence that, on the one hand, participants assign to the indicative conditional as probability the conditional probability of consequent given antecedent and, on the other, they assign to the indicative conditional the ?defective truth-table? in which a conditional with false antecedent is deemed neither true nor false, these findings do not in themselves establish which multi-premise inferences involving conditionals participants endorse. A natural extension of the truth-table semantics pronounces as valid numerous inference patterns that ...
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by Jc Beall, Ross Brady, J. Michael Dunn, et al.A. P. Hazen, Edwin Mares, Robert K. Meyer, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, David Ripley, John Slaney, Richard Sylvan
Abstract
One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley–Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing ...
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Abstract
A recent group of social scientists have argued that counterfactual questions play an essential role in their disciplines, and that it is possible to have rigorous methods to investigate them. Unfortunately, there has been little (if any) interaction between these social scientists and the philosophers who have long held that rigorous counterfactual reasoning is possible. In this paper, I hope to encourage some fresh thinking on both sides by creating new connections between them. I describe what I term “problem of ...
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posted to raising seem
by fintelkai
on 2012-04-13 13:46:27
Abstract
The present paper discusses the differences in distributional properties between schijnen and lijken: two Dutch raising-verbs that are often translated to English ‘seem’. According to the cartographic approach, for instance Haegeman, L. (2006a. Clitic Climbing and the Dual Status of Sembrare. Linguistic Inquiry 37, 484–501), the differences in distributional properties follow from a difference in their position in the syntactic structure. Lijken is proposed to be a lexical verb inserted in a low position. Schijnen on the other hand is a ...
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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to investigate a case in which certain features have been argued to sometimes play a role in the interpretation of an expression and sometimes not—in particular, the case of gender and person features on pronouns.1 That these are in certain configurations only agreement features which have no semantic content has been explored in numerous places; for an especially detailed study, see Kratzer (1998, 2008); see also Heim (2008), von Stechow (2003) and others. I argue ...
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Abstract
I present a puzzle concerning counterfactual reasoning and argue that it should be solved by giving up the principle of substitution for logical equivalents. ...
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posted to conditionals probability
by fintelkai
on 2012-04-02 15:02:22
Abstract
The so-called ‘Adams’ Thesis’ is often understood as the claim that the assertibility of an indicative conditional equals the corresponding conditional probability—schematically: $$( AT)\qquad\qquad\quad As(A\rightarrow B)=P(B|A), provided\quad P(A)\neq 0.$$ The Thesis is taken by many to be a touchstone of any theorizing about indicative conditionals. Yet it is unclear exactly what the Thesis is . I suggest some precise statements of it. I then rebut a number of arguments that have been given in its favor. Finally, I offer a new ...
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posted to deontic modality
by fintelkai
on 2012-03-13 14:48:31
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posted to conditionals probability
by fintelkai
on 2012-03-13 14:46:13
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posted to modality ought subjective
by fintelkai
on 2012-03-11 18:19:14
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posted to chomsky grammar public
by fintelkai
on 2012-02-25 15:40:27
Abstract
My modest aim in this note is to sketch three interrelated critiques of public languages, and to respond to them. All are broadly Chomskyan, and all support the same conclusion: that, insofar as they even exist, the study of public languages is not a viable scientific project. (Related critiques of semantics, understood as involving word–world relations, will be touched on as well). ...
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Abstract
There are certain uses of and and or that cannot be explained by their normal meanings as truth-functional connectives, even with sophisticated pragmatic resources. These include examples such as The cops show up, and a fight will break out (‘If the cops show up, a fight will break out’), and I have no friends, or I would throw a party (‘I have no friends. If I did have friends, I would throw a party.’). We argue that these uses are indeed ...
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posted to factivity knowledge
by fintelkai
on 2012-02-24 21:50:21
Abstract
This paper examines, and rejects, a recent argument to the effect that knowledge is not truth-entailing, i.e. that “know” is not factive. ...
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Abstract
Traditionally, most research in NLP has focused on propositional aspects of meaning. To truly understand language, however, extra-propositional aspects are equally important. Modality and negation typically contribute significantly to these extra-propositional meaning aspects. Although modality and negation have often been neglected by mainstream computational linguistics, interest has grown in recent years, as evidenced by several annotation projects dedicated to these phenomena. Researchers have started to work on modeling factuality, belief and certainty, detecting speculative sentences and hedging, identifying contradictions, and determining ...
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posted to belief probability revision
by fintelkai
on 2012-02-21 20:06:07
Abstract
This paper considers varieties of probabilism capable of distilling paradox-free qualitative doxastic notions (e.g., full belief, expectation, and plain belief) from a notion of probability taken as a primitive. We show that core systems, collections of nested propositions expressible in the underlying algebra, can play a crucial role in these derivations. We demonstrate how the notion of a probability core can be naturally generalized to high probability, giving rise to what we call a high probability core, a notion that when ...
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posted to deontic modality
by fintelkai
on 2012-02-16 15:01:20
Abstract
The article expands the traditional system of concepts used in deontic logic, in order to allow the inclusion of supererogatory behaviour. This requires the development of a deontic decagon. In addition, it is shown how this decagon can be used to interpret deontic terms, e.g. in Islamic Law. ...
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Abstract
Contextualism about ‘might’ says that the property that ‘might’ expresses varies from context to context. I argue against contextualism. I focus on problems that contextualism apparently has with attitude ascriptions in which ‘might’ appears in an embedded ‘that’-clause. I argue that contextualists can deal rather easily with many of these problems, but I also argue that serious difficulties remain with collective and quantified says-that ascriptions. Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne atempt to deal with these remaining problems, but I argue that ...
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Abstract
This paper concerns the formal semantic analysis of imperative sentences. It is argued that such an analysis cannot be deferred to the semantics of propositions, under any of the three commonly adopted strategies: the performative analysis, the sentence radical approach to propositions, and the (nondeclarative) mood-as-operator approach. Whereas the first two are conceptually problematic, the third faces empirical problems: various complex imperatives should be analysed in terms of semantic operators over simple imperatives. One particularly striking case is the Dutch pluperfect ...
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Abstract
We show how the problem of strengthening the antecedent which is both formally valid and yet often intuitively invalid, concessive conditionals, and conditional rhetorical questions fit into the theory of conditional elements put forth in Fulda (2010). ...
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Abstract
A paper by Schulz (Philos Stud 149:367–386, 2010 ) describes how the suppositional view of indicative conditionals can be supplemented with a derived view of epistemic modals. In a recent criticism of this paper, Willer (Philos Stud 153:365–375, 2011 ) argues that the resulting account of conditionals and epistemic modals cannot do justice to the validity of certain inference patterns involving modalised conditionals. In the present response, I analyse Willer’s argument, identify an implicit presupposition which can plausibly be denied and ...
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posted to attitudes descriptions
by fintelkai
on 2011-12-12 12:49:11
Abstract
It is widely agreed that sentences containing a non-denoting description embedded in the scope of a propositional attitude verb have true de dicto interpretations, and Russell’s (1905) analysis of definite descriptions is often praised for its simple analysis of such cases, cf. e.g. Neale (1990). However, several people, incl. Elbourne (2005, 2009), Heim (1991), and Kripke (2005), have contested this by arguing that Russell’s analysis yields incorrect predictions in non-doxastic attitude contexts. Heim and Elbourne have subsequently argued that once certain ...
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posted to biscuit conditionals subjunctive
by fintelkai
on 2011-12-05 11:55:54
Abstract
Conventional wisdom has it that many intriguing features of indicative conditionals aren’t shared by subjunctive conditionals. Subjunctive morphology is common in discussions of wishes and wants, however, and conditionals are commonly used in such discussions as well. As a result such discussions are a good place to look for subjunctive conditionals that exhibit features usually associated with indicatives alone. Here I offer subjunctive versions of J. L. Austin’s ‘biscuit’ conditionals—e.g., “There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them”—and subjunctive ...
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Abstract
An -ever free relative is felicitous only when the speaker doesn’t know, or doesn’t care about, the identity of the entity denoted. In this paper we investigate what it means to identify an entity by examining the non-identification condition on -ever free relatives. Following Dayal (In A. Lawson (Ed.), Proceedings of SALT VII, 1997 ), we analyze -ever free relatives as definites with a modal dimension. We show that the variation in the identity of the entity across the possible worlds ...
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Abstract
The traditional conception of language is that it is, in Aristotle's phrase, sound with meaning. The sound-meaning correlation is, furthermore, unbounded, an elementary fact that came to be understood as of great significance in the 17th century scientific revolution. In contemporary terms, the internal language (I-language) of an individual consists, at the very least, of a generative process that yields an infinite array of structured expressions, each interpreted at two interfaces, the sensory-motor interface (sound, sign, or some other sensory modality) ...
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Abstract
This squib presents two puzzles related to an ambiguity found in for -infinitival relative clauses (FIRs). FIRs invariably receive a modal interpretation even in the absence of any overt modal verb. The modal interpretation seems to come in two distinct types, which can be paraphrased by finite relative clauses employing the modal auxiliaries should and could . The two puzzles presented here arise because the availability of the two readings is constrained by factors that are not otherwise known to affect ...
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posted to presupposition semantics
by fintelkai
on 2011-10-18 12:06:47
Abstract
In this paper I propose a normative account of pragmatic presupposition as a criticism and enrichment of Gauker's theory. By an appeal to epistemic contextualism, my aim is to integrate Gauker's normative account with an explanation of the different ways in which speakers ought to share presuppositions. In particular, I focus my analysis on some stereotypical situations to show that the epistemic goal of a conversation determines the level of justification of a presupposition. Finally, I claim that coherence with the ...
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Abstract
The paper proposes a novel solution to the problem of scope posed by natural language indefinites that captures both the difference in scopal freedom between indefinites and bona fide quantifiers and the syntactic sensitivity that the scope of indefinites does nevertheless exhibit. Following the main insight of choice functional approaches, we connect the special scopal properties of indefinites to the fact that their semantics can be stated in terms of choosing a suitable witness. This is in contrast to bona fide ...
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Abstract
Counterfactual reasoning about how events could have turned out better is associated with the feeling of regret. However, developmental studies show a discrepancy between the onset of counterfactual reasoning (at 3 years) and the feeling of regret (at 6 years). In four experiments we explored possible reasons. Experiment 1 (3- to 6-year-old children) and Experiment 2 (adult control) show that even when regret is assessed more directly than in previous studies (e.g., Amsel 6- to 8-year-old children). Taken together, this ...
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Abstract
Propositional truth-value can be a defining feature of a sentence’s relevance to the unfolding discourse, and establishing propositional truth-value in context can be key to successful interpretation. In the current study, we investigate its role in the comprehension of counterfactual conditionals, which describe imaginary consequences of hypothetical events, and are thought to require keeping in mind both what is true and what is false. Pre-stored real-world knowledge may therefore intrude upon and delay counterfactual comprehension, which is predicted by some accounts ...
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Abstract
The commonplace view about metaphorical interpretation is that it can be characterized in traditional semantic and pragmatic terms, thereby assimilating metaphor to other familiar uses of language. We will reject this view, and propose in its place the view that, though metaphors can issue in distinctive cognitive and discourse effects, they do so without issuing in metaphorical meaning and truth, and so, without metaphorical communication. Our inspiration derives from Donald Davidson’s critical arguments against metaphorical meaning and Richard Rorty’s exploration of ...
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posted to counterfactuals semantics
by fintelkai
on 2011-10-04 13:51:53
Abstract
There are at least eight good reasons practicing historians should concern themselves with counterfactual claims. Furthermore, four of these reasons do not even require that we are able to tell which historical counterfactuals are true and which are false. This paper defends the claim that these reasons to be concerned with counterfactuals are good ones, and discusses how each can contribute to the practice of history. ...
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Abstract
This paper addresses the question of whether there can be a unitary account of expressive meaning by considering the descriptive ineffability of expressives such as damn or bastard, on the one hand, and certain kinds of repetition, on the other. Drawing on my (2002) work on the semantics of discourse markers and Wharton's (2009) work on the pragmatics of non-verbal communication, I show, first, that the notion of procedural meaning can provide an explanation for the descriptive ineffability of expressives such ...
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Abstract
Directive strategies, i.e. strategies through which the speaker orders someone to do something, are very frequent in everyday speech, and are particularly subject to processes of diachronic renewal. Based on a 200-language sample, this paper provides an extensive survey of the most frequent diachronic processes of emergence of positive directive strategies (imperatives, hortatives, jussives, etc.). Three basic processes are discussed: (i) the grammaticalization of lexical material into markers of orders and commands; (ii) the cooptation of non-directive forms (used in indirect ...
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posted to chinese clefts semantics
by fintelkai
on 2011-09-15 02:52:17
Abstract
The article presents an analysis of Chinese cleft sentences. Building on work conducted in the past decade, this work sets out to present a new account of Chinese cleft sentences in terms of overt movement, output-oriented linearization constraints and a presuppositional uniqueness requirement on events. I present a syntactic proposal which leads to an overt bipartition of cleft focus phrases and cleft presuppositions in syntax, mediated by the functional element de. The compositional semantic implementation of Chinese clefts derives the exhaustiveness ...
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posted to deontic dynamic logic
by fintelkai
on 2011-09-10 14:03:36
Abstract
This paper suggests that it should be possible to develop dynamic deontic logic as a counterpart to the very successful development of dynamic doxastic logic (or dynamic epistemic logic, as it is more often called). The ambition, arrived at towards the end of the paper, is to give formal representations of agentive concepts such as “the agent is about to do (has just done) α ” as well as of deontic concepts such as “it is obligatory (permissible, forbidden) for the ...
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Abstract
Schwarzschild (Nat Lang Semant 7:141–177, 1999 )’s account of givenness elaborates a notion of complementarity of givenness and focus in an intricate way: while givenness is semantically interpreted, focus is grammatically marked. It has been noticed, however, that under certain circumstances givenness in English is grammatically marked as well. Movement plays a role in this process. This paper provides further evidence for givenness marking. I present a case study of three Slavic languages (Czech, Russian, and Serbo-Croatian) in which givenness is ...
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