A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates Export

@article{osborne96, abstract = {We develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates. A winner implements her favorite policy. The equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning. For some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates, whose positions are distinct. Two-candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system (cf. Duverger's Law). The candidates' positions are less differentiated under a runoff system. There exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning.}, author = {Osborne, Martin J. and Slivinski, Al}, citeulike-article-id = {150513}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2946658}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2946658}, doi = {10.2307/2946658}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, keywords = {citizen\_candidates, political\_economics}, number = {1}, pages = {65--96}, posted-at = {2006-04-13 11:50:40}, priority = {2}, title = {A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2946658}, volume = {111}, year = {1996} }

TY - JOUR ID - osborne96 L3 - citeulike-article-id:150513 N2 - We develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates. A winner implements her favorite policy. The equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning. For some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates, whose positions are distinct. Two-candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system (cf. Duverger's Law). The candidates' positions are less differentiated under a runoff system. There exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning. IS - 1 JF - The Quarterly Journal of Economics EP - 96 TI - A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates VL - 111 SP - 65 KW - citizen_candidates KW - political_economics AU - Osborne, Martin AU - Slivinski, Al PY - 1996/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2946658 ER -