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Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax Export

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 4, No. 2. (February 1975), pp. 163-185.

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political_economics

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A fundamental problem in public finance is the determination of parameters of income tax functions. This paper focuses on this problem in the context of a linear tax function whose parameters are chosen according to majority vote by the taxpayers. The possibility of conflict between high national income and distributional equity is explored and it is found that, even when the distribution of earning power is rightward skew, majority voting does not necessarily lead to the adoption of a tax function which has the average tax rate rising with income.


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