A theory of agency Export

@techreport{citeulike:551877, abstract = {Three classes of real world properties distinguish Agents from other physical objects. These are: 1) Mechanical properties: Agents have mechanical properties that mere physical objects do not have. I shall characterise the main difference in terms of having an internal and renewable source of ” energy” or FORCE, versus not possessing such a source and thus having to rely on external sources. 2) Actional properties: Agents do not simply move and take part in events. Agents act in pursuit of goals and re-act to the environment as a result of perceiving. Mere physical objects do not act in pursuit of goals and do not perceive their environment. Furthermore, the acting and re-acting Agent can come together with another Agent and inter-act. 3) Cognitive properties: The behaviour of Agents is determined by cognitive properties, e.g., holding a certain attitude to the truth of a proposition. Mere physical objects do not have cognitive properties. My claim is that tracking each of these three classes of properties poses to some extent distinct information processing problems that require to some extent distinct solutions. My hypothesis is that, as the result of the evolution of a modular design, our core notions of Agency reflect three distinct processing mechanisms arranged hierarchically. Succeeding mechanisms interpret Agents' behaviour at succeeding levels of representation. Each level corresponds to a different ” subtheory” of Agency. Description at one level provides the principal relevant input for inferring the appropriate description at the next level. These three mechanisms with their respective ” subtheories” introduce in turn the three causal paradigms that form the core of human commonsense: ” mechanical causality”, ” teleological causality”, and ” psychological causality”.}, author = {Leslie, Alan M.}, booktitle = {RuCCS RT-12}, citeulike-article-id = {551877}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/tech_rpt/agency12.pdf}, comment = {This was a paper Leslie presented at Rutgers Cognitive Science group in 1993, along with discussions with Spelke and others. ---=note-separator=--- from the paper: Three sub-theories of Agency Three classes of real world properties distinguish Agents from other physical objects. These are: 1) Mechanical properties: Agents have mechanical properties that mere physical objects do not have. I shall characterise the main difference in terms of having an internal and renewable source of ” energy” or FORCE, versus not possessing such a source and thus having to rely on external sources. 2) Actional properties: Agents do not simply move and take part in events. Agents act in pursuit of goals and re-act to the environment as a result of perceiving. Mere physical objects do not act in pursuit of goals and do not perceive their environment. Furthermore, the acting and re-acting Agent can come together with another Agent and inter-act. 3) Cognitive properties: The behaviour of Agents is determined by cognitive properties, e.g., holding a certain attitude to the truth of a proposition. Mere physical objects do not have cognitive properties. My claim is that tracking each of these three classes of properties poses to some extent distinct information processing problems that require to some extent distinct solutions. My hypothesis is that, as the result of the evolution of a modular design, our core notions of Agency reflect three distinct processing mechanisms arranged hierarchically. Succeeding mechanisms interpret Agents' behaviour at succeeding levels of representation. Each level corresponds to a different ” subtheory” of Agency. Description at one level provides the principal relevant input for inferring the appropriate description at the next level. These three mechanisms with their respective ” subtheories” introduce in turn the three causal paradigms that form the core of human commonsense: ” mechanical causality”, ” teleological causality”, and ” psychological causality”.}, journal = {RuCCS RT-12}, keywords = {agency, module, psychology, theory\_of\_mind, tomm}, month = {November}, organization = {Rutgers University}, posted-at = {2006-03-14 17:32:49}, priority = {0}, publisher = {Rutgers University}, title = {A theory of agency}, url = {http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/tech_rpt/agency12.pdf}, year = {1993} }

TY - RPRT ID - citeulike:551877 L3 - citeulike-article-id:551877 N2 - Three classes of real world properties distinguish Agents from other physical objects. These are: 1) Mechanical properties: Agents have mechanical properties that mere physical objects do not have. I shall characterise the main difference in terms of having an internal and renewable source of “energy” or FORCE, versus not possessing such a source and thus having to rely on external sources. 2) Actional properties: Agents do not simply move and take part in events. Agents act in pursuit of goals and re-act to the environment as a result of perceiving. Mere physical objects do not act in pursuit of goals and do not perceive their environment. Furthermore, the acting and re-acting Agent can come together with another Agent and inter-act. 3) Cognitive properties: The behaviour of Agents is determined by cognitive properties, e.g., holding a certain attitude to the truth of a proposition. Mere physical objects do not have cognitive properties. My claim is that tracking each of these three classes of properties poses to some extent distinct information processing problems that require to some extent distinct solutions. My hypothesis is that, as the result of the evolution of a modular design, our core notions of Agency reflect three distinct processing mechanisms arranged hierarchically. Succeeding mechanisms interpret Agents' behaviour at succeeding levels of representation. Each level corresponds to a different “subtheory” of Agency. Description at one level provides the principal relevant input for inferring the appropriate description at the next level. These three mechanisms with their respective “subtheories” introduce in turn the three causal paradigms that form the core of human commonsense: “mechanical causality”, “teleological causality”, and “psychological causality”. JF - RuCCS RT-12 OR - Rutgers University TI - A theory of agency PB - Rutgers University T2 - RuCCS RT-12 KW - agency KW - module KW - psychology KW - theory_of_mind KW - tomm N1 - This was a paper Leslie presented at Rutgers Cognitive Science group in 1993, along with discussions with Spelke and others. N1 - from the paper: Three sub-theories of Agency Three classes of real world properties distinguish Agents from other physical objects. These are: 1) Mechanical properties: Agents have mechanical properties that mere physical objects do not have. I shall characterise the main difference in terms of having an internal and renewable source of “energy” or FORCE, versus not possessing such a source and thus having to rely on external sources. 2) Actional properties: Agents do not simply move and take part in events. Agents act in pursuit of goals and re-act to the environment as a result of perceiving. Mere physical objects do not act in pursuit of goals and do not perceive their environment. Furthermore, the acting and re-acting Agent can come together with another Agent and inter-act. 3) Cognitive properties: The behaviour of Agents is determined by cognitive properties, e.g., holding a certain attitude to the truth of a proposition. Mere physical objects do not have cognitive properties. My claim is that tracking each of these three classes of properties poses to some extent distinct information processing problems that require to some extent distinct solutions. My hypothesis is that, as the result of the evolution of a modular design, our core notions of Agency reflect three distinct processing mechanisms arranged hierarchically. Succeeding mechanisms interpret Agents' behaviour at succeeding levels of representation. Each level corresponds to a different “subtheory” of Agency. Description at one level provides the principal relevant input for inferring the appropriate description at the next level. These three mechanisms with their respective “subtheories” introduce in turn the three causal paradigms that form the core of human commonsense: “mechanical causality”, “teleological causality”, and “psychological causality”. AU - Leslie, Alan PY - 1993/11// UR - http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/tech_rpt/agency12.pdf ER -