Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes Export

@article{citeulike:132902, abstract = {Risk aversion plays an important role in explaining why antitrust cases settle instead of going to trial. Using a jointly estimated model of settlement and trial outcome, we find that a 1\% increase in the probability that the plaintiff wins at trial raises the probability of a settlement by 0.13\%. We also find that reputation effects are not a significant factor for defendants, so the risk aversion of the defendants does not play a dominant role in determining whether the parties settle. Plaintiffs are more likely to win in certain jurisdictions, which encourages venue shopping by plaintiffs.}, author = {Perloff, Jeffrey M. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L. and Ruud, Paul}, citeulike-article-id = {132902}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2109787}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, keywords = {antitrust}, number = {3}, pages = {401--409}, posted-at = {2005-03-18 14:36:42}, priority = {2}, title = {Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2109787}, volume = {78}, year = {1996} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:132902 L3 - citeulike-article-id:132902 N2 - Risk aversion plays an important role in explaining why antitrust cases settle instead of going to trial. Using a jointly estimated model of settlement and trial outcome, we find that a 1% increase in the probability that the plaintiff wins at trial raises the probability of a settlement by 0.13%. We also find that reputation effects are not a significant factor for defendants, so the risk aversion of the defendants does not play a dominant role in determining whether the parties settle. Plaintiffs are more likely to win in certain jurisdictions, which encourages venue shopping by plaintiffs. IS - 3 JF - The Review of Economics and Statistics EP - 409 TI - Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes VL - 78 SP - 401 KW - antitrust AU - Perloff, Jeffrey AU - Rubinfeld, Daniel AU - Ruud, Paul PY - 1996/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/2109787 ER -