The Generalized War of Attrition Export

@article{citeulike:201615, abstract = {We model a war of attrition with N + K firms competing for N prizes. In a \"natural oligopoly\" context, the K - 1 lowest-value firms drop out instantaneously, even though each firm's value is private information to itself. In a \"standard setting\" context, in which every competitor suffers losses until a standard is chosen, even after giving up on its own preferred alternative, each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of other players' actions. Our results explain how long it takes to form a winning coalition in politics. Solving the model is facilitated by the Revenue Equivalence Theorem.}, author = {Bulow, Jeremy and Klemperer, Paul}, citeulike-article-id = {201615}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/116984}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, keywords = {auction}, number = {1}, pages = {175--189}, posted-at = {2006-07-12 14:43:43}, priority = {2}, title = {The Generalized War of Attrition}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/116984}, volume = {89}, year = {1999} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:201615 L3 - citeulike-article-id:201615 N2 - We model a war of attrition with N + K firms competing for N prizes. In a "natural oligopoly" context, the K - 1 lowest-value firms drop out instantaneously, even though each firm's value is private information to itself. In a "standard setting" context, in which every competitor suffers losses until a standard is chosen, even after giving up on its own preferred alternative, each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of other players' actions. Our results explain how long it takes to form a winning coalition in politics. Solving the model is facilitated by the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. IS - 1 JF - The American Economic Review EP - 189 TI - The Generalized War of Attrition VL - 89 SP - 175 KW - auction AU - Bulow, Jeremy AU - Klemperer, Paul PY - 1999/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/116984 ER -