The normativity of the mental Export

@article{zang:norm05, abstract = {I describe and defend the view in a philosophy of mind that I call 'Normative Essentialism', according to which propositional attitudes have normative essences. Those normative essences are 'horizontal' rational requirements, by which I mean the requirement to have certain propositional attitudes given other propositional attitudes. Different propositional attitudes impose different horizontal rational requirements. I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this doctrine and argue for the weaker version. I explore the consequences for knowledge of mind, and I then consider objections to the view from mental causation, from empirical psychology, and from animals and small children.}, author = {Zangwill, Nick}, citeulike-article-id = {106233}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1386979042000336126}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/rpex/2005/00000008/00000001/art00001}, doi = {10.1080/1386979042000336126}, issn = {1386-9795}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, keywords = {attitudes, belief, content, mental, normativity}, month = {March}, number = {1}, pages = {1--19}, posted-at = {2005-03-13 04:32:35}, priority = {2}, publisher = {Routledge, part of the Taylor \& Francis Group}, title = {The normativity of the mental}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1386979042000336126}, volume = {8}, year = {2005} }

TY - JOUR ID - zang:norm05 L3 - citeulike-article-id:106233 N2 - I describe and defend the view in a philosophy of mind that I call 'Normative Essentialism', according to which propositional attitudes have normative essences. Those normative essences are 'horizontal' rational requirements, by which I mean the requirement to have certain propositional attitudes given other propositional attitudes. Different propositional attitudes impose different horizontal rational requirements. I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this doctrine and argue for the weaker version. I explore the consequences for knowledge of mind, and I then consider objections to the view from mental causation, from empirical psychology, and from animals and small children. IS - 1 JF - Philosophical Explorations SN - 1386-9795 EP - 19 TI - The normativity of the mental PB - Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group VL - 8 SP - 1 KW - attitudes KW - belief KW - content KW - mental KW - normativity AU - Zangwill, Nick PY - 2005/03// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1386979042000336126 ER -