Paranoid atmospheres: Psychiatric knowledge and delusional realities Export

@article{citeulike:5810954, abstract = {In this paper I investigate the topic of paranoid atmospheres. This subject is especially of interest with respect to persons who are deluded, and also, I will demonstrate, sheds light upon the psychiatrist's "gaze" and knowledge of delusions. In my argument I will follow a path initially outlined by Karl Jaspers (1883-1969): modern psychiatric diagnosis of delusions is a diagnosis of form and not content. Jaspers' emphasis on the form of delusions enables psychiatrists to be self-critical about their professional knowledge and, consequently, prevent the development of dogmatic attitudes. In accord with Jaspers, my argument will focus on the basic structure of delusions and highlight the difference between delusional realities and non-delusional realities, a difference that follows from the possibility of self-criticism of one's own conscious and explicit convictions. I will demonstrate the importance of self-criticism with regard to paranoid atmospheres and also to psychiatric knowledge. In this manner, an understanding of delusions as lived experience will be developed, which argues that an escalation of the influence of delusional convictions, resulting in a profoundly paranoid atmosphere, is most problematic for the deluded person. To acknowledge this insight mirrors the need for a self-critique of psychiatric discourse, encourages an empathic and respectful relationship between professionals and deluded patients, and enables deluded persons to restrict their paranoid atmosphere. It is the main conclusion of my paper that a deluded person cannot do (with respect to his delusional convictions) what a psychiatrist must do (with respect to his psychiatric knowledge and his own existential convictions) in order to prevent a profoundly paranoid atmosphere in their relationship: be self-critical.}, author = {Schlimme, Jann}, citeulike-article-id = {5810954}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1747-5341-4-14}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://view.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19761600}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://www.hubmed.org/display.cgi?uids=19761600}, day = {17}, doi = {10.1186/1747-5341-4-14}, issn = {1747-5341}, journal = {Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine}, month = {September}, number = {1}, pages = {14+}, posted-at = {2009-11-06 23:32:29}, priority = {2}, title = {Paranoid atmospheres: Psychiatric knowledge and delusional realities}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1747-5341-4-14}, volume = {4}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5810954 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5810954 N2 - In this paper I investigate the topic of paranoid atmospheres. This subject is especially of interest with respect to persons who are deluded, and also, I will demonstrate, sheds light upon the psychiatrist's "gaze" and knowledge of delusions. In my argument I will follow a path initially outlined by Karl Jaspers (1883-1969): modern psychiatric diagnosis of delusions is a diagnosis of form and not content. Jaspers' emphasis on the form of delusions enables psychiatrists to be self-critical about their professional knowledge and, consequently, prevent the development of dogmatic attitudes. In accord with Jaspers, my argument will focus on the basic structure of delusions and highlight the difference between delusional realities and non-delusional realities, a difference that follows from the possibility of self-criticism of one's own conscious and explicit convictions. I will demonstrate the importance of self-criticism with regard to paranoid atmospheres and also to psychiatric knowledge. In this manner, an understanding of delusions as lived experience will be developed, which argues that an escalation of the influence of delusional convictions, resulting in a profoundly paranoid atmosphere, is most problematic for the deluded person. To acknowledge this insight mirrors the need for a self-critique of psychiatric discourse, encourages an empathic and respectful relationship between professionals and deluded patients, and enables deluded persons to restrict their paranoid atmosphere. It is the main conclusion of my paper that a deluded person cannot do (with respect to his delusional convictions) what a psychiatrist must do (with respect to his psychiatric knowledge and his own existential convictions) in order to prevent a profoundly paranoid atmosphere in their relationship: be self-critical. IS - 1 JF - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine SN - 1747-5341 TI - Paranoid atmospheres: Psychiatric knowledge and delusional realities VL - 4 SP - 14 AU - Schlimme, Jann PY - 2009/09/17/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1747-5341-4-14 ER -