Evolutionary games on graphs Export

@article{SzFa07, abstract = {Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first four sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fifth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The next three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Rock–Scissors–Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.}, author = {Szabo, Gyorgy and Fath, Gabor}, citeulike-article-id = {1758645}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physrep.2007.04.004}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0370157307001810}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6TVP-4NKXWG8-1/2/0fa0069f11dff3d42f902b27591c6b37}, doi = {10.1016/j.physrep.2007.04.004}, issn = {03701573}, journal = {Physics Reports}, keywords = {co-evolution, minimax, solution\_concept}, month = {July}, number = {4-6}, pages = {97--216}, posted-at = {2007-12-10 14:55:11}, priority = {5}, title = {Evolutionary games on graphs}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physrep.2007.04.004}, volume = {446}, year = {2007} }

TY - JOUR ID - SzFa07 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1758645 N2 - Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first four sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fifth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The next three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Rock–Scissors–Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games. IS - 4-6 JF - Physics Reports SN - 03701573 EP - 216 TI - Evolutionary games on graphs VL - 446 SP - 97 KW - co-evolution KW - minimax KW - solution_concept AU - Szabo, Gyorgy AU - Fath, Gabor PY - 2007/07// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physrep.2007.04.004 ER -