Metacognition and metarepresentation: is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition? Export

@article{citeulike:2643252, abstract = {Abstract\ \ Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one's own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct.}, author = {Proust, Jo\"{e}lle}, citeulike-article-id = {2643252}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9208-3}, day = {17}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-007-9208-3}, journal = {Synthese}, month = {November}, number = {2}, pages = {271--295}, posted-at = {2008-04-09 01:56:57}, priority = {2}, title = {Metacognition and metarepresentation: is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition?}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9208-3}, volume = {159}, year = {2007} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2643252 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2643252 N2 - Abstract  Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct. IS - 2 JF - Synthese EP - 295 TI - Metacognition and metarepresentation: is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition? VL - 159 SP - 271 AU - Proust, Joëlle PY - 2007/11/17/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9208-3 ER -