Bridging and Fingerprinting: Epistemic Attacks on Route Selection Export

@inproceedings{citeulike:4529812, abstract = {Users building routes through an anonymization network must discover the nodes comprising the network. Yet, it is potentially costly, or even infeasible, for everyone to know the entire network. We introduce a novel attack, the route bridging attack, which makes use of what route creators do not know of the network. We also present new dis- cussion and results concerning route fingerprinting attacks, which make use of what route creators do know of the network. We prove analytic bounds for both route fingerprinting and route bridging and describe the impact of these attacks on published anonymity-network designs. We also discuss implications for network scaling and client-server vs. peer-to-peer systems.}, author = {Danezis, George and Syverson, Paul F.}, booktitle = {Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 8th International Symposium, PETS 2008}, citeulike-article-id = {4529812}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/default.aspx?id=76739}, day = {23-25}, isbn = {978-3-540-70629-8}, keywords = {anonymity, security}, location = {Leuven, Belgium}, month = {July}, pages = {151--166}, posted-at = {2009-05-17 04:47:10}, priority = {4}, publisher = {Springer}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, title = {Bridging and Fingerprinting: Epistemic Attacks on Route Selection}, url = {http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/default.aspx?id=76739}, volume = {5134}, year = {2008} }

TY - CONF ID - citeulike:4529812 L3 - citeulike-article-id:4529812 N2 - Users building routes through an anonymization network must discover the nodes comprising the network. Yet, it is potentially costly, or even infeasible, for everyone to know the entire network. We introduce a novel attack, the route bridging attack, which makes use of what route creators do not know of the network. We also present new dis- cussion and results concerning route fingerprinting attacks, which make use of what route creators do know of the network. We prove analytic bounds for both route fingerprinting and route bridging and describe the impact of these attacks on published anonymity-network designs. We also discuss implications for network scaling and client-server vs. peer-to-peer systems. CY - Leuven, Belgium SE - Lecture Notes in Computer Science SN - 978-3-540-70629-8 EP - 166 TI - Bridging and Fingerprinting: Epistemic Attacks on Route Selection PB - Springer VL - 5134 T2 - Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 8th International Symposium, PETS 2008 SP - 151 KW - anonymity KW - security AU - Danezis, George AU - Syverson, Paul PY - 2008/07/23-25/ UR - http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/default.aspx?id=76739 ER -