Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games Export

@article{citeulike:6067146, abstract = {We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected from games with the neighbors. The players, located on the sites of a two-dimensional lattice, follow unconditional cooperation or defection and use individual strategy adoption rule described by a parameter. If the system is started from a random initial state then the present co-evolutionary rule drives the system towards a state where only one evolutionary rule remains alive even in the coexistence of cooperative and defective behaviors. The final rule is related to the optimum providing the highest level of cooperation and affected by the topology of the connectivity structure.}, archivePrefix = {arXiv}, author = {Szabo, Gyorgy and Szolnoki, Attila and Vukov, Jeromos}, citeulike-article-id = {6067146}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://arxiv.org/abs/0911.0661}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://arxiv.org/pdf/0911.0661}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/87/18007}, day = {3}, doi = {10.1209/0295-5075/87/18007}, eprint = {0911.0661}, keywords = {game, opinion}, month = {Nov}, posted-at = {2009-11-04 10:01:09}, priority = {2}, title = {Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/87/18007}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:6067146 L3 - citeulike-article-id:6067146 N2 - We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected from games with the neighbors. The players, located on the sites of a two-dimensional lattice, follow unconditional cooperation or defection and use individual strategy adoption rule described by a parameter. If the system is started from a random initial state then the present co-evolutionary rule drives the system towards a state where only one evolutionary rule remains alive even in the coexistence of cooperative and defective behaviors. The final rule is related to the optimum providing the highest level of cooperation and affected by the topology of the connectivity structure. TI - Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games KW - game KW - opinion AU - Szabo, Gyorgy AU - Szolnoki, Attila AU - Vukov, Jeromos PY - 2009/Nov/03/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/87/18007 ER -