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Grounding attention in action control: The intentional control of selectionby: B. Hommel
edited by: B. J. BruyaIn Effortless attention: A new perspective in the cognitive science of attention and action (in press)
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AbstractThe main function of human attention is commonly thought to consist in preventing information overload of the cognitive system. In contrast, this chapter provides empirical evidence and theoretical reasons to consider attention a mere derivative of action control. It argues that the existence of distributed representations and concurrent processing streams creates specific control problems. Parts of these problems, so goes the claim, are solved by associating categories of actions (such as reaching or grasping) with particular perceptual dimensions in such a way that planning an action biases the cognitive system towards feature dimensions that are suited to specify the action‘s open parameters. This approach has major implications for attentional theory in general and the issue of effortless attention in particular.
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