StackGhost: Hardware Facilitated Stack Protection Export

@inproceedings{citeulike:1898462, abstract = {Conventional security exploits have relied on overwriting the saved return pointer on the stack to hijack the path of execution. Under Sun Microsystem 's Sparc processor architecture, we were able to implement a kernel modification to transparently and automatically guard applications' return pointers. Our implementation called StackGhost under OpenBSD 2.8 acts as a ghost in the machine. StackGhost advances exploit prevention in that it protects every application run on the system without their ...}, author = {Frantzen, Mike and Shuey, Mike}, citeulike-article-id = {1898462}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.29.1037}, keywords = {hardware\_security, stack, stackghost}, pages = {55--66}, posted-at = {2007-11-11 11:55:48}, priority = {0}, title = {StackGhost: Hardware Facilitated Stack Protection}, url = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.29.1037} }

TY - CONF ID - citeulike:1898462 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1898462 N2 - Conventional security exploits have relied on overwriting the saved return pointer on the stack to hijack the path of execution. Under Sun Microsystem 's Sparc processor architecture, we were able to implement a kernel modification to transparently and automatically guard applications' return pointers. Our implementation called StackGhost under OpenBSD 2.8 acts as a ghost in the machine. StackGhost advances exploit prevention in that it protects every application run on the system without their ... EP - 66 TI - StackGhost: Hardware Facilitated Stack Protection SP - 55 KW - hardware_security KW - stack KW - stackghost AU - Frantzen, Mike AU - Shuey, Mike UR - http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.29.1037 ER -