Information and the Market for Lemons Export

@article{lemons2, abstract = {This article revisits Akerlof's (1970) classic adverse-selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Better information on the selling side worsens the "buyer's curse," thus lowering demand, but may shift supply as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on the relative sizes of these effects. A characterization is given. On the other hand, improving the buyer's information-i.e., making private information public-unambiguously improves trade so long as market demand is downward sloping.}, author = {Levin, Jonathan}, citeulike-article-id = {4136955}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2696386}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2696386}, doi = {10.2307/2696386}, issn = {07416261}, journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics}, keywords = {assymmetry, information, quality}, number = {4}, pages = {657--666}, posted-at = {2009-03-05 18:00:32}, priority = {2}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The RAND Corporation}, title = {Information and the Market for Lemons}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2696386}, volume = {32}, year = {2001} }

TY - JOUR ID - lemons2 L3 - citeulike-article-id:4136955 N2 - This article revisits Akerlof's (1970) classic adverse-selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Better information on the selling side worsens the "buyer's curse," thus lowering demand, but may shift supply as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on the relative sizes of these effects. A characterization is given. On the other hand, improving the buyer's information-i.e., making private information public-unambiguously improves trade so long as market demand is downward sloping. IS - 4 JF - The RAND Journal of Economics SN - 07416261 EP - 666 TI - Information and the Market for Lemons PB - Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The RAND Corporation VL - 32 SP - 657 KW - assymmetry KW - information KW - quality AU - Levin, Jonathan PY - 2001/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2696386 ER -