Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England Export

@article{North&Weingast1989, abstract = {The article studies the evolution of the constitutional arrangements in seventeenth-century England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It focuses on the relationship between institutions and the behavior of the government and interprets the institutional changes on the basis of the goals of the winners-secure property rights, protection of their wealth, and the elimination of confiscatory government. We argue that the new institutions allowed the government to commit credibly to upholding property rights. Their success was remarkable, as the evidence from capital markets shows.}, author = {North, Douglass C. and Weingast, Barry R.}, citeulike-article-id = {5292336}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2122739}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2122739}, doi = {10.2307/2122739}, issn = {00220507}, journal = {The Journal of Economic History}, number = {4}, pages = {803--832}, posted-at = {2009-07-28 16:46:44}, priority = {2}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association}, title = {Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2122739}, volume = {49}, year = {1989} }

TY - JOUR ID - North&Weingast1989 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5292336 N2 - The article studies the evolution of the constitutional arrangements in seventeenth-century England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It focuses on the relationship between institutions and the behavior of the government and interprets the institutional changes on the basis of the goals of the winners-secure property rights, protection of their wealth, and the elimination of confiscatory government. We argue that the new institutions allowed the government to commit credibly to upholding property rights. Their success was remarkable, as the evidence from capital markets shows. IS - 4 JF - The Journal of Economic History SN - 00220507 EP - 832 TI - Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England PB - Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association VL - 49 SP - 803 AU - North, Douglass AU - Weingast, Barry PY - 1989/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2122739 ER -