Coevolutionary games on networks Export

@article{Ebel02, abstract = {We study agents on a network playing an iterated Prisoner's dilemma against their neighbors. The resulting spatially extended coevolutionary game exhibits stationary states which are Nash equilibria. After perturbation of these equilibria; avalanches of mutations reestablish a stationary state. Scale-free avalanche distributions are observed that are in accordance with calculations from the Nash equilibria and a confined branching process. The transition from subcritical to critical avalanche dynamics can be traced to a change in the degeneracy of the cooperative macrostate and is observed for many variants of this game.}, archivePrefix = {arXiv}, author = {Ebel, Holger and Bornholdt, Stefan}, citeulike-article-id = {1428730}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0208273}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://arxiv.org/pdf/cond-mat/0208273}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.66.056118}, citeulike-linkout-3 = {http://adsabs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-bib_query?bibcode=2002PhRvE..66e6118E}, citeulike-linkout-4 = {http://link.aps.org/abstract/PRE/v66/i5/e056118}, citeulike-linkout-5 = {http://link.aps.org/pdf/PRE/v66/i5/e056118}, doi = {10.1103/PhysRevE.66.056118}, eprint = {cond-mat/0208273}, journal = {Physical Review E}, keywords = {networks\_adaptive}, month = {Nov}, number = {5}, pages = {056118+}, posted-at = {2008-07-18 06:51:39}, priority = {2}, publisher = {American Physical Society}, title = {Coevolutionary games on networks}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.66.056118}, volume = {66}, year = {2002} }

TY - JOUR ID - Ebel02 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1428730 N2 - We study agents on a network playing an iterated Prisoner’s dilemma against their neighbors. The resulting spatially extended coevolutionary game exhibits stationary states which are Nash equilibria. After perturbation of these equilibria; avalanches of mutations reestablish a stationary state. Scale-free avalanche distributions are observed that are in accordance with calculations from the Nash equilibria and a confined branching process. The transition from subcritical to critical avalanche dynamics can be traced to a change in the degeneracy of the cooperative macrostate and is observed for many variants of this game. IS - 5 JF - Physical Review E TI - Coevolutionary games on networks PB - American Physical Society VL - 66 SP - 056118 KW - networks_adaptive AU - Ebel, Holger AU - Bornholdt, Stefan PY - 2002/Nov// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.66.056118 ER -