Group strategyproofness and no subsidy via lp-duality Export

@misc{citeulike:1001114, abstract = {We make two contributions to co-operative game theory, both of which rely heavily on linear programming duality theory. First, we introduce a fairness criterion on service providers, which we call No Subsidy. This condition ensures that a subset of the users is not overcharged in order to subsidize another set of users. We completely characterize cost functions that allow cost sharing mechanisms satisfying this condition. This class of cost functions contains the submodular functions, and...}, author = {Jain, K. and Vazirani, V.}, citeulike-article-id = {1001114}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.24.674}, keywords = {groupstrategyproof, linearprogramming, mechanism}, posted-at = {2006-12-19 00:16:49}, priority = {0}, title = {Group strategyproofness and no subsidy via lp-duality}, url = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.24.674}, year = {1999} }

TY - GEN ID - citeulike:1001114 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1001114 N2 - We make two contributions to co-operative game theory, both of which rely heavily on linear programming duality theory. First, we introduce a fairness criterion on service providers, which we call No Subsidy. This condition ensures that a subset of the users is not overcharged in order to subsidize another set of users. We completely characterize cost functions that allow cost sharing mechanisms satisfying this condition. This class of cost functions contains the submodular functions, and... TI - Group strategyproofness and no subsidy via lp-duality KW - groupstrategyproof KW - linearprogramming KW - mechanism AU - Jain, K AU - Vazirani, V PY - 1999/// UR - http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.24.674 ER -