Automated mechanism design: Complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting Export

@misc{citeulike:1080908, abstract = {multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that the agents are motivated to report their preferences truthfully and a (socially) desirable outcome is chosen. We propose an approach where a mechanism is automatically created for the preference aggregation setting at hand. This has several advantages, but the downside is that the mechanism design optimization problem needs to ...}, author = {Conitzer, V. and Sandholm, T.}, citeulike-article-id = {1080908}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.61.2389}, keywords = {complexity, mechanismdesign}, posted-at = {2007-01-31 21:43:11}, priority = {4}, title = {Automated mechanism design: Complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting}, url = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.61.2389}, year = {2003} }

TY - GEN ID - citeulike:1080908 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1080908 N2 - multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that the agents are motivated to report their preferences truthfully and a (socially) desirable outcome is chosen. We propose an approach where a mechanism is automatically created for the preference aggregation setting at hand. This has several advantages, but the downside is that the mechanism design optimization problem needs to ... TI - Automated mechanism design: Complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting KW - complexity KW - mechanismdesign AU - Conitzer, V AU - Sandholm, T PY - 2003/// UR - http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.61.2389 ER -