An analysis of peer-to-peer networks with altruistic peers Export

@article{citeulike:3912951, abstract = {Abstract\ \ We develop a new model of the interaction of rational peers in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network that has at its heart altruism, an intrinsic parameter reflecting peers' inherent willingness to contribute. Two different approaches for modelling altruistic behavior and its attendant benefit are introduced. With either approach, we use Game Theoretic analysis to calculate Nash equilibria and predict peer behavior in terms of individual contribution. We consider the cases of P2P networks of peers that (i) have homogeneous altruism levels or (ii) have heterogeneous altruism levels, but with known probability distributions. We find that, under the effects of altruism, a substantial fraction of peers will contribute when altruism levels are within certain intervals, even though no incentive mechanism is used. Our results corroborate empirical evidence of large P2P networks surviving or even flourishing without or with barely functioning incentive mechanisms. We also enhance the model with a simple but powerful incentive scheme to limit free-riding and increase contribution to the network, and show that the particular incentive scheme on networks with altruistic peers achieves its goal.}, author = {Vassilakis, Dimitrios and Vassalos, Vasilis}, citeulike-article-id = {3912951}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12083-008-0024-4}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/b188581085780821}, doi = {10.1007/s12083-008-0024-4}, journal = {Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications}, keywords = {altruistic, analysis, incentive, mechanism, modelling, p2p, peers, prediction}, posted-at = {2009-05-13 12:57:00}, priority = {5}, title = {An analysis of peer-to-peer networks with altruistic peers}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12083-008-0024-4} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3912951 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3912951 N2 - Abstract  We develop a new model of the interaction of rational peers in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network that has at its heart altruism, an intrinsic parameter reflecting peers’ inherent willingness to contribute. Two different approaches for modelling altruistic behavior and its attendant benefit are introduced. With either approach, we use Game Theoretic analysis to calculate Nash equilibria and predict peer behavior in terms of individual contribution. We consider the cases of P2P networks of peers that (i) have homogeneous altruism levels or (ii) have heterogeneous altruism levels, but with known probability distributions. We find that, under the effects of altruism, a substantial fraction of peers will contribute when altruism levels are within certain intervals, even though no incentive mechanism is used. Our results corroborate empirical evidence of large P2P networks surviving or even flourishing without or with barely functioning incentive mechanisms. We also enhance the model with a simple but powerful incentive scheme to limit free-riding and increase contribution to the network, and show that the particular incentive scheme on networks with altruistic peers achieves its goal. JF - Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications TI - An analysis of peer-to-peer networks with altruistic peers KW - altruistic KW - analysis KW - incentive KW - mechanism KW - modelling KW - p2p KW - peers KW - prediction AU - Vassilakis, Dimitrios AU - Vassalos, Vasilis UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12083-008-0024-4 ER -