In this paper we shed light on the extent to and forms in which linkages of states with their external environment influence international cooperation, controlling for domestic factors such as income and democracy. The existing empirical literature emphasizes domestic determinants and has, surprisingly, paid much less attention to international factors. We define external linkages in terms of involvement of states in international organizations and the world economy, and in terms of behavior that is contingent on what other countries do. To assess the effects of these factors relative to domestic determinants we study global environmental commitments in the form of ratification behavior by 180 countries vis-a-vis 340 treaties in the time-period 1950-2000. With the exception of integration into the world economy, which affects cooperative behavior negatively, the results show that international factors have a stronger, and positive, impact on cooperation than domestic factors. The main implication is that at least in the short to medium term it might be more efficient to foster global environmental cooperation by "entangling" reticent countries in international institutions and increasing incentives for contingent behavior, rather than promoting cooperation through democratization, socio-economic development, and trade.