Critical Realism and the Limits to Critical Social Science Export

@article{citeulike:1760480, abstract = {The paper assesses the aims and arguments of critical social science and the reconstructions of it provided by critical realist philosophy. It argues that attempts to derive normative conclusions on the basis of explanatory critiques of social phenomena are flawed in several important respects. Accounts of critical social science standardly underestimate the problems of justifying critical standpoints and finding alternative social forms which generate fewer problems than those they replace, and hence lead to net improvement. By arguing that value positions can be derived from explanatory critiques, the philosophical reconstructions make light of the normative issues raised by proposals for social change. They also ignore the question of the feasibility of alternative systems and the prevalence of structures which generate both good and bad effects. While the reconstructions succeed in defending critiques centering on straightforward cases of false beliefs or the frustration of universal human needs, in others, where culturally-specific needs and issues of social responsibilities are involved, they fail to recognise the need to address prior normative questions. It is therefore argued that the aims and claims of critical social science need to be moderated and its dependence on normative discourse properly acknowledged.}, author = {Sayer, Andrew}, citeulike-article-id = {1760480}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-5914.00052}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5914.00052}, doi = {10.1111/1468-5914.00052}, journal = {Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour}, keywords = {critical\_realism, critical\_theory, social\_theory}, number = {4}, pages = {473--488}, posted-at = {2007-10-12 14:23:22}, priority = {2}, title = {Critical Realism and the Limits to Critical Social Science}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5914.00052}, volume = {27}, year = {1997} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1760480 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1760480 N2 - The paper assesses the aims and arguments of critical social science and the reconstructions of it provided by critical realist philosophy. It argues that attempts to derive normative conclusions on the basis of explanatory critiques of social phenomena are flawed in several important respects. Accounts of critical social science standardly underestimate the problems of justifying critical standpoints and finding alternative social forms which generate fewer problems than those they replace, and hence lead to net improvement. By arguing that value positions can be derived from explanatory critiques, the philosophical reconstructions make light of the normative issues raised by proposals for social change. They also ignore the question of the feasibility of alternative systems and the prevalence of structures which generate both good and bad effects. While the reconstructions succeed in defending critiques centering on straightforward cases of false beliefs or the frustration of universal human needs, in others, where culturally-specific needs and issues of social responsibilities are involved, they fail to recognise the need to address prior normative questions. It is therefore argued that the aims and claims of critical social science need to be moderated and its dependence on normative discourse properly acknowledged. IS - 4 JF - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour EP - 488 TI - Critical Realism and the Limits to Critical Social Science VL - 27 SP - 473 KW - critical_realism KW - critical_theory KW - social_theory AU - Sayer, Andrew PY - 1997/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5914.00052 ER -