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A Policy Model for Secure Information FlowFoundations and Applications of Security Analysis In Foundations and Applications of Security Analysis, Vol. 5511 (2009), pp. 1-17.
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AbstractWhen a computer program requires legitimate access to confidential data, the question arises whether such a program may illegally reveal sensitive information. This paper proposes a policy model to specify what information flow is permitted in a computational system. The security definition, which is based on a general notion of information lattices, allows various representations of information to be used in the enforcement of secure information flow in deterministic or nondeterministic systems. A flexible semantics-based analysis technique is presented, which uses the input-output relational model induced by an attacker’s observational power, to compute the information released by the computational system. An illustrative attacker model demonstrates the use of the technique to develop a termination-sensitive analysis. The technique allows the development of various information flow analyses, parametrised by the attacker’s observational power, which can be used to enforce what declassification policies.
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