Secretary Problems with Competing Employers Export

@incollection{citeulike:3367306, abstract = {In many decentralized labor markets, job candidates are offered positions at very early stages in the hiring process. It has been argued that these early offers are an effect of the competition between employers for the best candidate. This work studies the timing of offers in a theoretical model based on the classical secretary problem. We consider a secretary problem with multiple employers and study the equilibria of the induced game. Our results confirm the observation of early offers in labor markets: for several classes of strategies based on optimal stopping theory, as the number of employers grows, the timing of the earliest offer decreases.}, author = {Immorlica, Nicole and Kleinberg, Robert and Mahdian, Mohammad}, citeulike-article-id = {3367306}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11944874_35}, doi = {10.1007/11944874_35}, journal = {Internet and Network Economics}, keywords = {game-theory, hiring-problem}, pages = {389--400}, posted-at = {2008-10-02 22:32:45}, priority = {2}, title = {Secretary Problems with Competing Employers}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11944874_35}, year = {2006} }

TY - CHAP ID - citeulike:3367306 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3367306 N2 - In many decentralized labor markets, job candidates are offered positions at very early stages in the hiring process. It has been argued that these early offers are an effect of the competition between employers for the best candidate. This work studies the timing of offers in a theoretical model based on the classical secretary problem. We consider a secretary problem with multiple employers and study the equilibria of the induced game. Our results confirm the observation of early offers in labor markets: for several classes of strategies based on optimal stopping theory, as the number of employers grows, the timing of the earliest offer decreases. JF - Internet and Network Economics EP - 400 TI - Secretary Problems with Competing Employers SP - 389 KW - game-theory KW - hiring-problem AU - Immorlica, Nicole AU - Kleinberg, Robert AU - Mahdian, Mohammad PY - 2006/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11944874_35 ER -