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Cooperative behavior in a model of evolutionary snowdrift games with N-person interactions |
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Notes for this articleN人版Snowdrift(チキン,タカハト)ゲームでの協調の進化. SnowdriftゲームのC,Dの利得関数はオリジナルで,2人版から作っている. それのレプリケータダイナミクスの数理・数値解析をしている. 協調者の頻度はNに反比例する. ゲームをする人数が増えると協調は進化しづらい
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AbstractWe propose a model of evolutionary snowdrift game with N-person interactions and study the effects of multi-person interactions on the emergence of cooperation. An exact N-th–order equation for the equilibrium density of cooperators x* is derived for a well-mixed population using the approach of replicator dynamics. The results show that the extent of cooperation drops with increasing cost-to-benefit ratio and the number N of interaction persons in a group, with x*~1/N for large N. An algorithm for numerical simulations is constructed for the model. The simulation results are in good agreement with theoretical results of the replicator dynamics.
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