Insider Trading, Equity Issues, and CEO Turnover in Firms Subject to Securities Class Action Export

@article{citeulike:3203926, abstract = {In the typical securities class action (SCA), firms and their managers are sued for securities law violations by shareholders who allege that managers fraudulently withheld negative information or published misleading information during a period known as the "class period." We examine insider selling and seasoned equity issues during this period to investigate whether managers have an unusual incentive to delay disclosure of negative information. We also examine whether firms that settle SCAs experience an abnormal level of CEO turnover, which would suggest that some suits have merit and that these suits provide a deterrent.}, author = {Niehaus, Greg and Roth, Greg}, citeulike-article-id = {3203926}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3666303}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3666303}, doi = {10.2307/3666303}, issn = {00463892}, journal = {Financial Management}, keywords = {sical}, number = {4}, pages = {52--72}, posted-at = {2008-09-08 05:01:17}, priority = {2}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Financial Management Association International}, title = {Insider Trading, Equity Issues, and CEO Turnover in Firms Subject to Securities Class Action}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3666303}, volume = {28}, year = {1999} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3203926 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3203926 N2 - In the typical securities class action (SCA), firms and their managers are sued for securities law violations by shareholders who allege that managers fraudulently withheld negative information or published misleading information during a period known as the "class period." We examine insider selling and seasoned equity issues during this period to investigate whether managers have an unusual incentive to delay disclosure of negative information. We also examine whether firms that settle SCAs experience an abnormal level of CEO turnover, which would suggest that some suits have merit and that these suits provide a deterrent. IS - 4 JF - Financial Management SN - 00463892 EP - 72 TI - Insider Trading, Equity Issues, and CEO Turnover in Firms Subject to Securities Class Action PB - Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Financial Management Association International VL - 28 SP - 52 KW - sical AU - Niehaus, Greg AU - Roth, Greg PY - 1999/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3666303 ER -