Managerial Disclosures and Shareholder Litigation Export

@article{citeulike:3203937, abstract = {Abstract\ \ This paper explores the link between shareholder lawsuits brought under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and managerial disclosures of prospective information. When the manager's information is such that there is no affirmative duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5, previous research has shown that the manager will withhold his information if it is sufficiently unfavorable and will disclose it otherwise. When the manager's information is such that there exists an affirmative duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5, it is shown here that the manager will release either good news or news that is sufficiently bad. Further, the good news disclosures are expected to be more precise than those that reflect unfavorable information. It is also demonstrated that the probability of a disclosure will increase with both the precision of the manager's information and the variability of his firm's earnings.}, author = {Trueman, Brett}, citeulike-article-id = {3203937}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1018303309137}, day = {17}, doi = {10.1023/A:1018303309137}, journal = {Review of Accounting Studies}, keywords = {sical}, month = {June}, number = {2}, pages = {181--199}, posted-at = {2008-09-08 05:12:38}, priority = {2}, title = {Managerial Disclosures and Shareholder Litigation}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1018303309137}, volume = {2}, year = {1997} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3203937 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3203937 N2 - Abstract  This paper explores the link between shareholder lawsuits brought under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and managerial disclosures of prospective information. When the manager's information is such that there is no affirmative duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5, previous research has shown that the manager will withhold his information if it is sufficiently unfavorable and will disclose it otherwise. When the manager's information is such that there exists an affirmative duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5, it is shown here that the manager will release either good news or news that is sufficiently bad. Further, the good news disclosures are expected to be more precise than those that reflect unfavorable information. It is also demonstrated that the probability of a disclosure will increase with both the precision of the manager's information and the variability of his firm's earnings. IS - 2 JF - Review of Accounting Studies EP - 199 TI - Managerial Disclosures and Shareholder Litigation VL - 2 SP - 181 KW - sical AU - Trueman, Brett PY - 1997/06/17/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1018303309137 ER -