Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences

by: Anders Poulsen, Gert Svendsen

Public Choice, Vol. 123, No. 1-2. (April 2005), pp. 171-196.

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze whether social capital can emerge endogenously from a process of preference evolution. We define social capital as preferences that promote voluntary cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We investigate how the endogenous preferences depend on the amount of information individuals have about each other’s preferences. When there is sufficiently much information, maximal social capital emerges. In general, the level of social capital varies positively with the amount of information. Our results may add to an understanding of the factors that determine a society’s ability to generate cooperative outcomes.

@article{PoulsenSvendsen_2005, abstract = {In this paper we analyze whether social capital can emerge endogenously from a process of preference evolution. We define social capital as preferences that promote voluntary cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We investigate how the endogenous preferences depend on the amount of information individuals have about each other’s preferences. When there is sufficiently much information, maximal social capital emerges. In general, the level of social capital varies positively with the amount of information. Our results may add to an understanding of the factors that determine a society’s ability to generate cooperative outcomes.}, author = {Poulsen, Anders and Svendsen, Gert }, citeulike-article-id = {265257}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-0266-0}, issn = {0048-5829}, journal = {Public Choice}, keywords = {capital, endogenous, preferences, rate, social, time}, month = {April}, number = {1-2}, pages = {171--196}, posted-at = {2008-05-02 18:52:36}, priority = {2}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, title = {Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-0266-0}, volume = {123}, year = {2005} }

RIS record

TY - JOUR ID - PoulsenSvendsen_2005 L3 - citeulike-article-id:265257 TI - Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences JF - Public Choice VL - 123 IS - 1-2 SP - 171 EP - 196 PB - Kluwer Academic Publishers SN - 0048-5829 N2 - In this paper we analyze whether social capital can emerge endogenously from a process of preference evolution. We define social capital as preferences that promote voluntary cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We investigate how the endogenous preferences depend on the amount of information individuals have about each other’s preferences. When there is sufficiently much information, maximal social capital emerges. In general, the level of social capital varies positively with the amount of information. Our results may add to an understanding of the factors that determine a society’s ability to generate cooperative outcomes. KW - capital KW - endogenous KW - preferences KW - rate KW - social KW - time AU - Poulsen, Anders AU - Svendsen, Gert PY - 2005/04// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-0266-0 ER -

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