Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox Export

@article{citeulike:5776336, abstract = {According to the Olson paradox, larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups in furthering their interests. We address the issue in a model with three distinctive features: explicit intergroup interaction, collective prizes with a varying mix of public and private characteristics, and nonlinear lobbying costs. The interplay of these features leads to new results. When the cost of lobbying has the elasticity of a quadratic function, or higher, larger groups are more effective no matter how private the prize. With smaller elasticities, a threshold degree of publicness is enough to overturn the Olson argument, and this threshold tends to zero as the elasticity approaches the value for a quadratic function. We also demonstrate that these results are true, irrespective of whether we examine group sizes over the cross-section in some given equilibrium or changes in the size of a given group over different equilibria.}, author = {Esteban, Joan and Ray, Debraj}, citeulike-article-id = {5776336}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=93863}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055401003124}, doi = {10.1017/S0003055401003124}, journal = {American Political Science Review}, keywords = {campaign, charisma, cooperation, endogenous-parties, group\_sizes, political-economy, political-parties, team}, number = {03}, pages = {663--672}, posted-at = {2009-09-11 17:20:58}, priority = {2}, title = {Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055401003124}, volume = {95}, year = {2001} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5776336 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5776336 N2 - According to the Olson paradox, larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups in furthering their interests. We address the issue in a model with three distinctive features: explicit intergroup interaction, collective prizes with a varying mix of public and private characteristics, and nonlinear lobbying costs. The interplay of these features leads to new results. When the cost of lobbying has the elasticity of a quadratic function, or higher, larger groups are more effective no matter how private the prize. With smaller elasticities, a threshold degree of publicness is enough to overturn the Olson argument, and this threshold tends to zero as the elasticity approaches the value for a quadratic function. We also demonstrate that these results are true, irrespective of whether we examine group sizes over the cross-section in some given equilibrium or changes in the size of a given group over different equilibria. IS - 03 JF - American Political Science Review EP - 672 TI - Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox VL - 95 SP - 663 KW - campaign KW - charisma KW - cooperation KW - endogenous-parties KW - group_sizes KW - political-economy KW - political-parties KW - team AU - Esteban, Joan AU - Ray, Debraj PY - 2001/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055401003124 ER -