Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of the commons'

@article{citeulike:773965, author = {Milinski, Manfred and Semmann, Dirk and Krambeck, Hans-Jurgen}, citeulike-article-id = {773965}, comment = {that the need to maintain reputation for indirect reciprocity maintains contributions to the public good at an unexpectedly high level. But if rounds of indirect reciprocation are not expected, then contributions to the public good drop quickly to zero. Alternating the games leads to higher profits for all players. As reputation may be a currency that is valid in many social games, our approach could be used to test social dilemmas for their solubility.}, doi = {10.1038/415424a}, journal = {Nature}, keywords = {commons, cooperation, reputation, tragedy, trust}, month = {January}, number = {6870}, pages = {424--426}, posted-at = {2007-04-04 16:09:31}, priority = {4}, title = {Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of the commons'}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/415424a}, volume = {415}, year = {2002} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:773965 L3 - citeulike-article-id:773965 IS - 6870 JF - Nature EP - 426 TI - Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of the commons' VL - 415 SP - 424 KW - commons KW - cooperation KW - reputation KW - tragedy KW - trust N1 - that the need to maintain reputation for indirect reciprocity maintains contributions to the public good at an unexpectedly high level. But if rounds of indirect reciprocation are not expected, then contributions to the public good drop quickly to zero. Alternating the games leads to higher profits for all players. As reputation may be a currency that is valid in many social games, our approach could be used to test social dilemmas for their solubility. AU - Milinski, Manfred AU - Semmann, Dirk AU - Krambeck, Hans-Jurgen PY - 2002/01/24/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/415424a ER -