A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms Export

@article{citeulike:757186, abstract = {In modelling competition among mechanism designers, it is necessary to specify the set of feasible mechanisms. These specifications are often borrowed from the optimal mechanism design literature and exclude mechanisms that are natural in a competitive environment, for example, mechanisms that depend on the mechanisms chosen by competitors. This paper constructs a set of mechanisms that is universal in that any specific model of the feasible set can be embedded in it. An equilibrium for a specific model is robust if and only if it is an equilibrium also for the universal set of mechanisms. A key to the construction is a language for describing mechanisms that is not tied to any preconceived notions of the nature of competition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, D89, C72.}, author = {Epstein, Larry G. and Peters, Michael}, citeulike-article-id = {757186}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2542}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45FKNY8-12/2/d4e4c5a4255ad345c61754fa99773636}, doi = {10.1006/jeth.1999.2542}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {agency, contract, design}, month = {September}, number = {1}, pages = {119--160}, posted-at = {2006-07-13 16:06:40}, priority = {2}, title = {A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2542}, volume = {88}, year = {1999} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:757186 L3 - citeulike-article-id:757186 N2 - In modelling competition among mechanism designers, it is necessary to specify the set of feasible mechanisms. These specifications are often borrowed from the optimal mechanism design literature and exclude mechanisms that are natural in a competitive environment, for example, mechanisms that depend on the mechanisms chosen by competitors. This paper constructs a set of mechanisms that is universal in that any specific model of the feasible set can be embedded in it. An equilibrium for a specific model is robust if and only if it is an equilibrium also for the universal set of mechanisms. A key to the construction is a language for describing mechanisms that is not tied to any preconceived notions of the nature of competition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, D89, C72. IS - 1 JF - Journal of Economic Theory EP - 160 TI - A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms VL - 88 SP - 119 KW - agency KW - contract KW - design AU - Epstein, Larry AU - Peters, Michael PY - 1999/09// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2542 ER -