piaser's design [19 articles] Export Sort

Recent papers added to piaser's library classified by the tag design. You can also see everyone's design.

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	Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices [My Copy] Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 75, No. 1. (July 1997), pp. 141-179. by Michael Peters, Sergei Severinov posted to auctions contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 16:07:32 as
	A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms [My Copy] Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 88, No. 1. (September 1999), pp. 119-160. by Larry G. Epstein, Michael Peters posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 16:06:40 as
	Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency [My Copy] Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 111, No. 1. (July 2003), pp. 88-109. by Michael Peters posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 16:05:48 as along with 1 person ggathrig
	Internet auctions with many traders [My Copy] Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 130, No. 1. (September 2006), pp. 220-245. by M. Peters, S. Severinov posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 16:04:38 as along with 1 person toomash
	Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109] [My Copy] Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof by Michael Peters posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 16:03:29 as
	Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions [My Copy] Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. In Press, Corrected Proof by Andrea Attar, Gwenael Piaser, Nicolas Porteiro posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 16:02:12 as
	Surplus Extraction and Competition [My Copy] The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 68, No. 3. (2001), pp. 613-631. by Michael Peters posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 15:59:51 as
	Common Agency and the Revelation Principle [My Copy] Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 5. (2001), pp. 1349-1372. by Michael Peters posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 15:58:42 as along with 1 person ggathrig
	Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information [My Copy] The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 4. (1976), pp. 629-649. by Michael Rothschild, Joseph Stiglitz posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 15:53:04 as along with 3 people jrblevin andersok mcshech
	Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case [My Copy] Econometrica, Vol. 69, No. 4. (July 2001), pp. 1077-1098. by Helmut Bester, Roland Strausz posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 14:39:37 as
	The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility [My Copy] Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2. (April 1979), pp. 185-216. by Partha S. Dasgupta, Peter J. Hammond, Eric S. Maskin posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 14:38:58 as
	Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result [My Copy] Econometrica, Vol. 41, No. 4. (July 1973), pp. 587-601. by Allan Gibbard posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 14:38:03 as
	Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods [My Copy] Econometrica, Vol. 45, No. 2. (March 1977), pp. 427-438. by Jerry Green, Jean-Jacques Laffont posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 14:37:20 as
	Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem [My Copy] Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 1. ( 1979), pp. 61-73. by Roger B. Myerson posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 14:36:32 as
	Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle [My Copy] Economics Letters, Vol. 79, No. 3. (June 2003), pp. 333-337. by Roland Strausz posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 14:35:49 as
	Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts [My Copy] RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, No. 2. ( 2004), pp. 306-328. by Alberto Bisin, Danilo Guaitoli posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 14:31:46 as
	Work incentives and household insurance: Sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard [My Copy] Economics Letters, Vol. 92, No. 1. (July 2006), pp. 82-88. by Cecile Aubert posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 14:30:06 as
	Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing [My Copy] Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 39, No. 1-2. (February 2003), pp. 63-109. by Jr Page, Paulo K. Monteiro posted to agency contract design by piaser on 2006-07-13 14:17:00 as
	Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players [My Copy] The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 72, No. 2. (April 2005), pp. 543-566. by O. Jackson, Wilkie Simon posted to design mechanism by piaser on 2006-07-13 13:33:36 as along with 2 people ggathrig YoshiY

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