The Principal's Moral Hazard: Constraints on the Use of Incentives in Hierarchy Export

@article{citeulike:1173017, author = {Miller and Gary, J. and Whitford and Andrew, B.}, citeulike-article-id = {1173017}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mul004}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/17/2/213}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/jopart/2007/00000017/00000002/art00213}, doi = {10.1093/jopart/mul004}, issn = {1053-1858}, journal = {Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory}, keywords = {agency-theory, dissertation, incentives}, month = {April}, number = {2}, pages = {213--233}, posted-at = {2009-02-06 02:03:56}, priority = {2}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, title = {The Principal's Moral Hazard: Constraints on the Use of Incentives in Hierarchy}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mul004}, volume = {17}, year = {2007} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1173017 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1173017 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory SN - 1053-1858 EP - 233 TI - The Principal's Moral Hazard: Constraints on the Use of Incentives in Hierarchy PB - Oxford University Press VL - 17 SP - 213 KW - agency-theory KW - dissertation KW - incentives AU - Miller AU - Gary, J AU - Whitford AU - Andrew, B PY - 2007/04// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mul004 ER -