The metaphysics of quantity Export

@article{citeulike:3020928, abstract = {A formal theory of quantity TQis presented which is realist, Platonist, and syntactically second-order (while logically elementary), in contrast with the existing formal theories of quantity developed within the theory of measurement, which are empiricist, nominalist, and syntactically first-order (while logically non-elementary). TQis shown to be formally and empirically adequate as a theory of quantity, and is argued to be scientifically superior to the existing first-order theories of quantity in that it does not depend upon empirically unsupported assumptions concerning existence of physical objects (e.g. that any two actual objects have an actual sum). The theory TQsupports and illustrates a form of naturalistic Platonism, for which claims concerning the existence and properties of universals form part of natural science, and the distinction between accidental generalizations and laws of nature has a basis in the second-order structure of the world.}, author = {Mundy, Brent}, citeulike-article-id = {3020928}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00353961}, day = {1}, doi = {10.1007/BF00353961}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, keywords = {metaphysics, monomeric}, month = {January}, number = {1}, pages = {29--54}, posted-at = {2008-07-19 15:24:54}, priority = {2}, title = {The metaphysics of quantity}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00353961}, volume = {51}, year = {1987} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3020928 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3020928 N2 - A formal theory of quantity TQis presented which is realist, Platonist, and syntactically second-order (while logically elementary), in contrast with the existing formal theories of quantity developed within the theory of measurement, which are empiricist, nominalist, and syntactically first-order (while logically non-elementary). TQis shown to be formally and empirically adequate as a theory of quantity, and is argued to be scientifically superior to the existing first-order theories of quantity in that it does not depend upon empirically unsupported assumptions concerning existence of physical objects (e.g. that any two actual objects have an actual sum). The theory TQsupports and illustrates a form of naturalistic Platonism, for which claims concerning the existence and properties of universals form part of natural science, and the distinction between accidental generalizations and laws of nature has a basis in the second-order structure of the world. IS - 1 JF - Philosophical Studies EP - 54 TI - The metaphysics of quantity VL - 51 SP - 29 KW - metaphysics KW - monomeric AU - Mundy, Brent PY - 1987/01/01/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00353961 ER -