The Standard Model as a Philosophical Challenge Export

@article{citeulike:3804309, abstract = {doi: 10.1086/595864 There are two opposing traditions in contemporary quantum field theory (QFT). Mainstream Lagrangian QFT led to and supports the standard model of particle interactions. Algebraic QFT seeks to provide a rigorous consistent mathematical foundation for field theory, but cannot accommodate the local gauge interactions of the standard model. Interested philosophers face a choice. They can accept algebraic QFT on the grounds of mathematical consistency and general accord with the semantic conception of theory interpretation. This suggests a rejection of particle ontology. Or they can accept the standard model on the grounds of its established success. This alternative, which I defend, suggests revising philosophical accounts of scientific theory and finding some way of accommodating particles.}, author = {MacKinnon, Edward}, citeulike-article-id = {3804309}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/595864}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/595864}, day = {1}, doi = {10.1086/595864}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, keywords = {foundations, philosophy, philsci, physics, qft}, month = {October}, number = {4}, pages = {447--457}, posted-at = {2009-10-27 17:35:23}, priority = {1}, title = {The Standard Model as a Philosophical Challenge}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/595864}, volume = {75}, year = {2008} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:3804309 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3804309 N2 - doi: 10.1086/595864 There are two opposing traditions in contemporary quantum field theory (QFT). Mainstream Lagrangian QFT led to and supports the standard model of particle interactions. Algebraic QFT seeks to provide a rigorous consistent mathematical foundation for field theory, but cannot accommodate the local gauge interactions of the standard model. Interested philosophers face a choice. They can accept algebraic QFT on the grounds of mathematical consistency and general accord with the semantic conception of theory interpretation. This suggests a rejection of particle ontology. Or they can accept the standard model on the grounds of its established success. This alternative, which I defend, suggests revising philosophical accounts of scientific theory and finding some way of accommodating particles. IS - 4 JF - Philosophy of Science EP - 457 TI - The Standard Model as a Philosophical Challenge VL - 75 SP - 447 KW - foundations KW - philosophy KW - philsci KW - physics KW - qft AU - MacKinnon, Edward PY - 2008/10/01/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/595864 ER -