Are deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions observationally equivalent? Export

@article{citeulike:5519804, abstract = {The central question of this paper is: are deterministic and indeterministic descriptions observationally equivalent in the sense that they give the same predictions? I tackle this question for measure-theoretic deterministic systems and stochastic processes, both of which are ubiquitous in science. I first show that for many measure-theoretic deterministic systems there is a stochastic process which is observationally equivalent to the deterministic system. Conversely, I show that for all stochastic processes there is a measure-theoretic deterministic system which is observationally equivalent to the stochastic process. Still, one might guess that the measure-theoretic deterministic systems which are observationally equivalent to stochastic processes used in science do not include any deterministic systems used in science. I argue that this is not so because deterministic systems used in science even give rise to Bernoulli processes. Despite this, one might guess that measure-theoretic deterministic systems used in science cannot give the same predictions at every observation level as stochastic processes used in science. By proving results in ergodic theory, I show that also this guess is misguided: there are several deterministic systems used in science which give the same predictions at every observation level as Markov processes. All these results show that measure-theoretic deterministic systems and stochastic processes are observationally equivalent more often than one might perhaps expect. Furthermore, I criticize the claims of some previous philosophy papers on observational equivalence.}, author = {Werndl, Charlotte}, citeulike-article-id = {5519804}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2009.06.004}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S135521980900032X}, day = {18}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsb.2009.06.004}, issn = {13552198}, journal = {Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics}, keywords = {determinism, philosophy, philsci, physics}, month = {August}, number = {3}, pages = {232--242}, posted-at = {2009-10-27 17:39:52}, priority = {2}, title = {Are deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions observationally equivalent?}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2009.06.004}, volume = {40}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5519804 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5519804 N2 - The central question of this paper is: are deterministic and indeterministic descriptions observationally equivalent in the sense that they give the same predictions? I tackle this question for measure-theoretic deterministic systems and stochastic processes, both of which are ubiquitous in science. I first show that for many measure-theoretic deterministic systems there is a stochastic process which is observationally equivalent to the deterministic system. Conversely, I show that for all stochastic processes there is a measure-theoretic deterministic system which is observationally equivalent to the stochastic process. Still, one might guess that the measure-theoretic deterministic systems which are observationally equivalent to stochastic processes used in science do not include any deterministic systems used in science. I argue that this is not so because deterministic systems used in science even give rise to Bernoulli processes. Despite this, one might guess that measure-theoretic deterministic systems used in science cannot give the same predictions at every observation level as stochastic processes used in science. By proving results in ergodic theory, I show that also this guess is misguided: there are several deterministic systems used in science which give the same predictions at every observation level as Markov processes. All these results show that measure-theoretic deterministic systems and stochastic processes are observationally equivalent more often than one might perhaps expect. Furthermore, I criticize the claims of some previous philosophy papers on observational equivalence. IS - 3 JF - Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics SN - 13552198 EP - 242 TI - Are deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions observationally equivalent? VL - 40 SP - 232 KW - determinism KW - philosophy KW - philsci KW - physics AU - Werndl, Charlotte PY - 2009/08/18/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2009.06.004 ER -