Beyond reduction: mechanisms, multifield integration and the unity of neuroscience Export

@article{citeulike:6090391, abstract = {Philosophers of neuroscience have traditionally described interfield integration using reduction models. Such models describe formal inferential relations between theories at different levels. I argue against reduction and for a mechanistic model of interfield integration. According to the mechanistic model, different fields integrate their research by adding constraints on a multilevel description of a mechanism. Mechanistic integration may occur at a given level or in the effort to build a theory that oscillates among several levels. I develop this alternative model using a putative exemplar of reduction in contemporary neuroscience: the relationship between the psychological phenomena of learning and memory and the electrophysiological phenomenon known as Long-Term Potentiation. A new look at this historical episode reveals the relative virtues of the mechanistic model over reduction as an account of interfield integration.}, author = {Craver, C.}, citeulike-article-id = {6090391}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.03.008}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1369848605000245}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.03.008}, issn = {13698486}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences}, keywords = {neuroscience, philosophy, philsci, reduction}, month = {June}, number = {2}, pages = {373--395}, posted-at = {2009-11-09 19:55:15}, priority = {0}, title = {Beyond reduction: mechanisms, multifield integration and the unity of neuroscience}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.03.008}, volume = {36}, year = {2005} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:6090391 L3 - citeulike-article-id:6090391 N2 - Philosophers of neuroscience have traditionally described interfield integration using reduction models. Such models describe formal inferential relations between theories at different levels. I argue against reduction and for a mechanistic model of interfield integration. According to the mechanistic model, different fields integrate their research by adding constraints on a multilevel description of a mechanism. Mechanistic integration may occur at a given level or in the effort to build a theory that oscillates among several levels. I develop this alternative model using a putative exemplar of reduction in contemporary neuroscience: the relationship between the psychological phenomena of learning and memory and the electrophysiological phenomenon known as Long-Term Potentiation. A new look at this historical episode reveals the relative virtues of the mechanistic model over reduction as an account of interfield integration. IS - 2 JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences SN - 13698486 EP - 395 TI - Beyond reduction: mechanisms, multifield integration and the unity of neuroscience VL - 36 SP - 373 KW - neuroscience KW - philosophy KW - philsci KW - reduction AU - Craver, C PY - 2005/06// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.03.008 ER -