Group Agency. The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents

Contents Preface Introduction I: The Logical Possibility of Group Agents 1: The Conditions of Agency 2: The aggregation of intentional attitudes 3: The structure of group agents II: The Organizational Design of Group Agents 4: The Epistemic Desideratum 5: The Incentive-Compatibility Desideratum 6: The Control Desideratum III: The Normative Status of Group Agents 7: Holding Group Agents Responsible 8: Personifying Group Agents 9: Identifying with Group Agents References Endnotes blurb:Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individual agents that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should explain the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable on the model of individual agents. Group Agency offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, to a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences. Christian List and Philip Pettit argue that there really are group or corporate agents, over and above the individual agents who compose them, and that a proper approach to the social sciences, law, morality, and politics must take account of this fact. Unlike some earlier defences of group agency, their account is entirely unmysterious in character and, despite not being technically difficult, is grounded in cutting-edge work in social choice theory, economics, and philosophy.