Security Games for Vehicular Networks
Vehicular networks (VANETs) can be used to improve transportation security, reliability, and management. This paper investigates security aspects of VANETs within a game-theoretic framework where defensive measures are optimized with respect to threats posed by malicious attackers. The formulations are chosen to be abstract on purpose in order to maximize applicability of the models and solutions to future systems. The security games proposed for vehicular networks take as an input centrality measures computed by mapping the centrality values of the car networks to the underlying road topology. The resulting strategies help locating most valuable or vulnerable points (e.g., against jamming) in vehicular networks. Thus, optimal deployment of traffic control and security infrastructure is investigated both in the static (e.g., fixed roadside units) and dynamic cases (e.g., mobile law enforcement units). Multiple types of security games are studied under varying information availability assumptions for the players, leading to fuzzy game and fictitious play formulations in addition to classical zero-sum games. The effectiveness of the security game solutions is evaluated numerically using realistic simulation data obtained from traffic engineering systems.