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Arrow's Theorem, Weglorz' Models and the Axiom of Choice Export

Mathematical Logic Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 3. (2000), pp. 335-359.

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Applying Weglorz' models of set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate Arrow-type social welfare functions for infinite societies with restricted coalition algebras. We show that there is a reasonable, nondictatorial social welfare function satisfying “finite discrimination", if and only if in Weglorz' model there is a free ultrafilter on a set representing the individuals. AMS-subject classification: 03E35 (Consistency and Independence Proofs), 90A08 (Social Choice). Journal of Economic Literature Classifications: D71 (Social Choice; Clubs; Committees), A12 (Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines).


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