Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability Export

@article{mihara97et, abstract = {Summary.   A social welfare function for a denumerable society satisfies Pairwise Computability if for each pair (x,y) of alternatives, there exists an algorithm that can decide from any description of each profile on x,y whether the society prefers x to y. I prove that if a social welfare function satisfying Unanimity and Independence also satisfies Pairwise Computability, then it is dictatorial. This result severely limits on practical grounds Fishburn's resolution (1970) of Arrow's impossibility. I also give an interpretation of a denumerable ” society.”}, author = {Mihara, H. R.}, citeulike-article-id = {2818122}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050157}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/3h3nh2093wdjht39}, comment = {computational social choice? }, day = {18}, doi = {10.1007/s001990050157}, journal = {Economic Theory}, keywords = {algorithms, arrow-impossibility-theorem, computability, computer\_science, economics, hayeks-knowledge-problem, political\_science, preference-aggregation, recursion-theory, social\_choice, ultrafilters, vita}, month = {August}, number = {2}, pages = {257--276}, posted-at = {2008-05-21 05:02:50}, priority = {0}, title = {Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050157}, volume = {10}, year = {1997} }

TY - JOUR ID - mihara97et L3 - citeulike-article-id:2818122 N2 - Summary.   A social welfare function for a denumerable society satisfies Pairwise Computability if for each pair (x,y) of alternatives, there exists an algorithm that can decide from any description of each profile on x,y whether the society prefers x to y. I prove that if a social welfare function satisfying Unanimity and Independence also satisfies Pairwise Computability, then it is dictatorial. This result severely limits on practical grounds Fishburn's resolution (1970) of Arrow's impossibility. I also give an interpretation of a denumerable “society.” IS - 2 JF - Economic Theory EP - 276 TI - Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability VL - 10 SP - 257 KW - algorithms KW - arrow-impossibility-theorem KW - computability KW - computer_science KW - economics KW - hayeks-knowledge-problem KW - political_science KW - preference-aggregation KW - recursion-theory KW - social_choice KW - ultrafilters KW - vita N1 - computational social choice? AU - Mihara, HR PY - 1997/08/18/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050157 ER -