Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow’s Theorem with restricted coalition algebras Export

@article{mihara97scw, abstract = {Abstract.   In the very general setting of Armstrong (1980) for Arrow's Theorem, I show two results. First, in an infinite society, Anonymity is inconsistent with Unanimity and Independence if and only if a domain for social welfare functions satisfies a modest condition of richness. While Arrow's axioms can be satisfied, unequal treatment of individuals thus persists. Second, Neutrality is consistent with Unanimity (and Independence). However, there are both dictatorial and nondictatorial social welfare functions satisfying Unanimity and Independence but not Neutrality. In Armstrong's setting, one can naturally view Neutrality as a stronger condition of informational simplicity than Independence.}, author = {Mihara, H. R.}, citeulike-article-id = {2818130}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050083}, doi = {10.1007/s003550050083}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, keywords = {anonymity, arrow-impossibility-theorem, boolean-algebras, coalitions, economics, informational-simplicity, political\_science, social\_choice, ultrafilters, vita}, number = {4}, pages = {503--512}, posted-at = {2008-05-21 04:55:36}, priority = {0}, title = {Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050083}, volume = {14}, year = {1997} }

TY - JOUR ID - mihara97scw L3 - citeulike-article-id:2818130 N2 - Abstract.   In the very general setting of Armstrong (1980) for Arrow’s Theorem, I show two results. First, in an infinite society, Anonymity is inconsistent with Unanimity and Independence if and only if a domain for social welfare functions satisfies a modest condition of richness. While Arrow’s axioms can be satisfied, unequal treatment of individuals thus persists. Second, Neutrality is consistent with Unanimity (and Independence). However, there are both dictatorial and nondictatorial social welfare functions satisfying Unanimity and Independence but not Neutrality. In Armstrong’s setting, one can naturally view Neutrality as a stronger condition of informational simplicity than Independence. IS - 4 JF - Social Choice and Welfare EP - 512 TI - Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow’s Theorem with restricted coalition algebras VL - 14 SP - 503 KW - anonymity KW - arrow-impossibility-theorem KW - boolean-algebras KW - coalitions KW - economics KW - informational-simplicity KW - political_science KW - social_choice KW - ultrafilters KW - vita AU - Mihara, HR PY - 1997/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050083 ER -