Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives Export

@article{mihara00scw, abstract = {Abstract.   In a framework allowing infinitely many individuals, I prove that coalitionally strategyproof social choice functions satisfy ” tops only.” That is, they depend only on which alternative each individual prefers the most, not on which alternative she prefers the second most, the third,…, or the least. The functions are defined on the domain of profiles measurable with respect to a Boolean algebra of coalitions. The unrestricted domain of profiles is an example of such a domain. I also prove an extension theorem.}, author = {Mihara, H. R.}, citeulike-article-id = {2818146}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050170}, doi = {10.1007/s003550050170}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, keywords = {dominant-strategy-implementation, economics, gibbard-satterthwaite-theorem, infinitely-large-societies, political\_science, social-choice-functions, social\_choice, tops-only, vita}, month = {May}, number = {3}, pages = {393--402}, posted-at = {2008-05-21 05:10:54}, priority = {0}, title = {Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050170}, volume = {17}, year = {2000} }

TY - JOUR ID - mihara00scw L3 - citeulike-article-id:2818146 N2 - Abstract.   In a framework allowing infinitely many individuals, I prove that coalitionally strategyproof social choice functions satisfy “tops only.” That is, they depend only on which alternative each individual prefers the most, not on which alternative she prefers the second most, the third,…, or the least. The functions are defined on the domain of profiles measurable with respect to a Boolean algebra of coalitions. The unrestricted domain of profiles is an example of such a domain. I also prove an extension theorem. IS - 3 JF - Social Choice and Welfare EP - 402 TI - Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives VL - 17 SP - 393 KW - dominant-strategy-implementation KW - economics KW - gibbard-satterthwaite-theorem KW - infinitely-large-societies KW - political_science KW - social-choice-functions KW - social_choice KW - tops-only KW - vita AU - Mihara, HR PY - 2000/05// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050170 ER -