Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof Export

@article{mihara01scw, abstract = {Abstract.   This paper gives a concrete example of a nondictatorial, coalitionally strategyproof social choice function for countably infinite societies. The function is defined for those profiles such that for each alternative, the coalition that prefers it the most is ” describable.” The ” describable” coalitions are assumed to form a countable Boolean algebra. The paper discusses oligarchical characteristics of the function, employing a specific interpretation of an infinite society. The discussion clarifies within a single framework a connection between the negative result (the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem) for finite societies and the positive result for infinite ones.}, author = {Mihara, H. R.}, citeulike-article-id = {2818157}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550000075}, doi = {10.1007/s003550000075}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, keywords = {countable-boolean-algebras-of-coalitions, dominant-strategy-implementation, economics, free-ultrafilters, gibbard-satterthwaite-theorem, infinitely-large-societies, models-of-knowledge, partitional-information-functions, plurality-rule, political\_science, social\_choice, strategyproof, vita}, month = {July}, number = {3}, pages = {543--553}, posted-at = {2008-05-21 05:16:27}, priority = {0}, title = {Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550000075}, volume = {18}, year = {2001} }

TY - JOUR ID - mihara01scw L3 - citeulike-article-id:2818157 N2 - Abstract.   This paper gives a concrete example of a nondictatorial, coalitionally strategyproof social choice function for countably infinite societies. The function is defined for those profiles such that for each alternative, the coalition that prefers it the most is “describable.” The “describable” coalitions are assumed to form a countable Boolean algebra. The paper discusses oligarchical characteristics of the function, employing a specific interpretation of an infinite society. The discussion clarifies within a single framework a connection between the negative result (the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem) for finite societies and the positive result for infinite ones. IS - 3 JF - Social Choice and Welfare EP - 553 TI - Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof VL - 18 SP - 543 KW - countable-boolean-algebras-of-coalitions KW - dominant-strategy-implementation KW - economics KW - free-ultrafilters KW - gibbard-satterthwaite-theorem KW - infinitely-large-societies KW - models-of-knowledge KW - partitional-information-functions KW - plurality-rule KW - political_science KW - social_choice KW - strategyproof KW - vita AU - Mihara, HR PY - 2001/07// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550000075 ER -