The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games Export

@article{kumabe-m08scw, abstract = {The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-criterion ranking): the number of alternatives that the players can always deal with rationally is less than this number. We comprehensively study the restrictions that various properties for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We find that a computable game has a finite Nakamura number greater than three only if it is proper, nonstrong, and nonweak, regardless of whether it is monotonic or whether it has a finite carrier. The lack of strongness often results in alternatives that cannot be strictly ranked.}, author = {Kumabe, Masahiro and Mihara, H. R.}, citeulike-article-id = {2818168}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0300-5}, comment = {Working Paper: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/pramprapa/3684.htm }, doi = {10.1007/s00355-008-0300-5}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, keywords = {axiomatic-method, computability, computer\_science, cooperative\_game\_theory, core, economics, multi-criterion-decision-making, nakamura-number, political\_science, social\_choice, vita, voting-games}, pages = {621--640}, posted-at = {2008-10-13 01:13:36}, priority = {0}, title = {The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0300-5}, volume = {31}, year = {2008} }

TY - JOUR ID - kumabe-m08scw L3 - citeulike-article-id:2818168 N2 - The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-criterion ranking): the number of alternatives that the players can always deal with rationally is less than this number. We comprehensively study the restrictions that various properties for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We find that a computable game has a finite Nakamura number greater than three only if it is proper, nonstrong, and nonweak, regardless of whether it is monotonic or whether it has a finite carrier. The lack of strongness often results in alternatives that cannot be strictly ranked. JF - Social Choice and Welfare EP - 640 TI - The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games VL - 31 SP - 621 KW - axiomatic-method KW - computability KW - computer_science KW - cooperative_game_theory KW - core KW - economics KW - multi-criterion-decision-making KW - nakamura-number KW - political_science KW - social_choice KW - vita KW - voting-games N1 - Working Paper: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/pramprapa/3684.htm AU - Kumabe, Masahiro AU - Mihara, HR PY - 2008/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0300-5 ER -