Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result Export

@article{gibbard73, abstract = {It has been conjectured that no system of voting can preclude strategic voting--the securing by a voter of an outcome he prefers through misrepresentation of his preferences. In this paper, for all significant systems of voting in which chance plays no role, the conjecture is verified. To prove the conjecture, a more general theorem in game theory is proved: a game form is a game without utilities attached to outcomes; only a trivial game form, it is shown, can guarantee that whatever the utilities of the players may be, each player will have a dominant pure strategy.}, author = {Gibbard, Allan}, citeulike-article-id = {3759281}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1914083}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1914083}, comment = {Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof http://www.citeulike.org/user/reiju/article/2818157 Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives http://www.citeulike.org/user/reiju/article/2818146 }, doi = {10.2307/1914083}, issn = {00129682}, journal = {Econometrica}, keywords = {gibbard-satterthwaite-theorem, social\_choice, strategyproof}, number = {4}, pages = {587--601}, posted-at = {2008-12-09 11:32:58}, priority = {2}, publisher = {The Econometric Society}, title = {Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1914083}, volume = {41}, year = {1973} }

TY - JOUR ID - gibbard73 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3759281 N2 - It has been conjectured that no system of voting can preclude strategic voting--the securing by a voter of an outcome he prefers through misrepresentation of his preferences. In this paper, for all significant systems of voting in which chance plays no role, the conjecture is verified. To prove the conjecture, a more general theorem in game theory is proved: a game form is a game without utilities attached to outcomes; only a trivial game form, it is shown, can guarantee that whatever the utilities of the players may be, each player will have a dominant pure strategy. IS - 4 JF - Econometrica SN - 00129682 EP - 601 TI - Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result PB - The Econometric Society VL - 41 SP - 587 KW - gibbard-satterthwaite-theorem KW - social_choice KW - strategyproof N1 - Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof http://www.citeulike.org/user/reiju/article/2818157 Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives http://www.citeulike.org/user/reiju/article/2818146 AU - Gibbard, Allan PY - 1973/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1914083 ER -