Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions*1 Export

@article{satterthwaite75, abstract = {Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategy-proof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I prove three theorems. First, every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial. Second, this paper's strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow's rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-negative response, and citizens' sovereignty conditions for social welfare functions. Third, Arrow's general possibility theorem is proven in a new manner.}, author = {Satterthwaite, M.}, citeulike-article-id = {3759295}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0022-0531(75)90050-2}, comment = {Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof http://www.citeulike.org/user/reiju/article/2818157 Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives http://www.citeulike.org/user/reiju/article/2818146 }, doi = {10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2}, issn = {00220531}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {gibbard-satterthwaite-theorem, social\_choice, strategyproof}, month = {April}, number = {2}, pages = {187--217}, posted-at = {2008-12-09 11:42:09}, priority = {2}, title = {Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions*1}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2}, volume = {10}, year = {1975} }

TY - JOUR ID - satterthwaite75 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3759295 N2 - Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategy-proof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I prove three theorems. First, every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial. Second, this paper's strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow's rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-negative response, and citizens' sovereignty conditions for social welfare functions. Third, Arrow's general possibility theorem is proven in a new manner. IS - 2 JF - Journal of Economic Theory SN - 00220531 EP - 217 TI - Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions*1 VL - 10 SP - 187 KW - gibbard-satterthwaite-theorem KW - social_choice KW - strategyproof N1 - Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof http://www.citeulike.org/user/reiju/article/2818157 Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives http://www.citeulike.org/user/reiju/article/2818146 AU - Satterthwaite, M PY - 1975/04// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2 ER -