A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision Export

@article{may52, author = {May, Kenneth O.}, citeulike-article-id = {3759311}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1907651}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1907651}, comment = {Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras http://www.citeulike.org/user/reiju/article/2818130 Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games http://www.citeulike.org/user/reiju/article/2818160 }, doi = {10.2307/1907651}, issn = {00129682}, journal = {Econometrica}, keywords = {axiomatic-method, preference\_aggregation, social\_choice}, number = {4}, pages = {680--684}, posted-at = {2008-12-09 11:50:13}, priority = {2}, publisher = {The Econometric Society}, title = {A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1907651}, volume = {20}, year = {1952} }

TY - JOUR ID - may52 L3 - citeulike-article-id:3759311 IS - 4 JF - Econometrica SN - 00129682 EP - 684 TI - A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision PB - The Econometric Society VL - 20 SP - 680 KW - axiomatic-method KW - preference_aggregation KW - social_choice N1 - Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow’s Theorem with restricted coalition algebras http://www.citeulike.org/user/reiju/article/2818130 Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games http://www.citeulike.org/user/reiju/article/2818160 AU - May, Kenneth PY - 1952/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1907651 ER -